A two speed mind? : for a heuristic interpretation of dual-process theories = L'esprit à deux vitesses? : pour une interprétation heuristique des théories à processus duaux by Beaulac, Guillaume
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL
 
A TWO SPEED MIND?
 
FOR A HEURISTIC INTERPRETATION OF DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES
 
(L'ESPRIT À DEUX VITESSES?
 
POUR UNE INTERPRÉTATION HEURISTIQUE
 
DES THÉORIES À PROCESSUS DUAUX)
 
MÉMOIRE
 
PRÉSENTÉ
 
COMME EXIGENCE PARTIELLE
 
À LA MAÎTRISE EN PHILOSOPHIE
 
PAR
 
GUILLAUME BEAULAC
 
DÉCEMBRE 2010
 
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL
 
Service des bibliothèques
 
Avertissement 
La diffusion de ce mémoire se fait dans le respect des droits de son auteur, qui a signé 
le formulaire Autorisation de reproduire et de diffuser un travail de recherche de cycles 
supérieurs (SDU-522 - Rév.01-2006). Cette autorisation stipule que «conformément à 
l'article 11 du Règlement no 8 des études de cycles supérieurs, [l'auteur] concède à 
l'Université du Québec à Montréal une licence non exclusive d'utilisation et de 
publication de la totalité ou d'une partie importante de [son] travail de recherche pour 
des fins pédagogiques et non commerciales. Plus précisément, [l'auteur] autorise 
l'Université du Québec à Montréal à reproduire, diffuser, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des 
copies de [son] travail de recherche à des fins non commerciales sur quelque support 
que ce soit, y compris l'Internet. Cette licence et cette autorisation n'entraînent pas une 
renonciation de [la] part [de l'auteur] à [ses] droits moraux ni à [ses] droits de propriété 
intellectuelle. Sauf ententè contraire, [l'auteur] conserve la liberté de diffuser et de 
commercialiser ou non ce travail dont [il] possède un exemplaire.» 
Savoir, et ne point faire usage de ce qu'on sait, c'est pire qu'ignorer. 
Alain, Propos sur l'éducation 
AVANT-PROPOS
 
Je souhaitais d'abord me consacrer à des questions liées à la philosophie de l'éducation, 
mais j'ai vite constaté qu'une telle réflexion ne pouvait se détacher de questions liées à la 
connaissance, à l'apprentissage et à la pédagogie et, plus largement, à des questions touchant 
aux fondements des sciences cognitives et à de complexes problèmes de nature politique. La 
démarche de ce mémoire s'inscrit dans un seul de ces aspects, soit les fondements d'une 
théorie en sciences cognitives. Les autres aspects demeurent toutefois bien présents, comme 
motivation et, surtout, comme assises de ce travail. 
Je tiens à remercier toutes les personnes que j'ai croisées durant mon épopée uqamienne. 
Je tiens aussi à remercier, plus particulièrement: Pierre Poirier, mon directeur de recherche, 
professeur de philosophie à l'UQAM, pour ses importantes contributions à l'ensemble du 
travail réalisé ici, mais aussi pour son rôle conune guide et critique; Murray Clarke, mon co­
directeur, professeur de philosophie à l'Université Concordia ; Luc Faucher et Serge Robert, 
membres du jury, professeurs de philosophie à l'UQAM ; Normand Baillargeon, professeur 
au département d'éducation et de pédagogie de l'UQAM ; Mathieu Marion, professeur de 
philosophie à l'UQAM ainsi que les personnes formidables avec qui j'ai eu un plaisir dingue 
à organiser la quatrième La nuit de la philosophie, Sindy Brodeur, Eve-Lyne Couturier, 
Marianne Di Croce, Jean-François Landry, Frédéric Legris, Annie Locat, Philippe Marchand 
et Simon Tremblay-Pepin. Je remercie enfin le CRSH (2008-2009) et le FQRSC (2009-2010) 
pour le soutien financier dont j'ai pu bénéficier tout au long de mes études de maîtrise. 
Merci aussi à celles et celui qui me rappellent qu'il y a de la vie hors des murs de 
l'université: Roch Beaulac et Linda Charron, mes parents, ainsi que ma soeur Amélie, merci 
pour le soutien que seule une famille peut offrir. Je dédie ce mémoire à Evelyn McDuff. 
Tu l'as subi du début à la fin, c'est la moindre des choses que je puisse t'offrir en échange! 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
AVANT-PROPOS iii
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS : iv
 
LIST OF FIGURES vi
 
LIST OF TABLES vii
 
RÉSUMÉ viii
 
ABSTRACT ix
 
INTRODUCTION 1
 
0.1 Outline of this dissertation 5
 
0.2 Viewing the mind evolutionarily: the framework 9
 
CHAPTERI 
DOES THE MIND WORK THAT WAY? MODULARITY AND ITS LIMITS Il 
1.1 Fodor's modularity 13
 
1.2 Evolutionary Psychology, massive modularity and the many definitions of
 
'module' 18
 
1.3 Carruthers' account of massive modularity: strong central modularity and weak 
modules 21
 
lA Samuels' account of massive modularity: weak central modularity and stronger
 
modules 27
 
1.5 Conclusion 30
 
CHAPTER II
 
CAN THE MIND BE DIVIDED INTO (ONLY) TWO SYSTEMS? A CRITICAL
 
OVERVIEW OF DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES: 32
 
2.1 Brief overview of dual-process theories 33
 
2.2 Carruthers and the multiple iterations of System 1 processes 40
 
v 
2.3 Lieberman on neurological and deep functional differences 46
 
2.4 Unsystematic systems 50
 
2.4.1 Stanovich's three minds 51
 
2.4.2 Evans' Type 3 processes 53
 
2.5 Conclusion 54
 
CHAPTER III
 
CONCEPTUAL SPACE AND THE TYPE 1/ TYPE 2 DISTINCTION AS A HEURISTIC:
 
ANOTHER ACCOUNT OF DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES 56
 
3.1 From 'Systems' to 'Types': going beyond 58
 
3.2 Continua, conceptual space, frontiers and some grey areas 61
 
3.2.1 One continuum or multiple continua? 65
 
3.2.2 What is n's value? 68
 
3.2.3 Frontiers and clusters 71
 
3.2.4 Type 1 and Type 2 as a heuristic distinction 74
 
3.3 Sorne advantages of this view 77
 
3.3.1 Crossovers: mixing characteristics 79
 
3.3.2 The modularization of Type 2 processes 80
 
3.3.3 Working with a conceptual space 83
 
3.4 Conclusion 85
 
CONCLUSION 87
 
AFTERWORD
 
WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES? 91
 
5.1 Dual-Process Epistemology? 93
 
REFERENCES 97
 
LIST OF FIGURES
 
Figure Page 
2.1 Hypothesized neural correlates of the C-system supporting reflective 
social cognition and the X-system supporting reflex ive social 
cognition displayed on a canonical brain rendering from (A) lateral, 
(B) ventral, and (C) media! views. (From Lieberman, 2007, 262) 47 
3.1 Prototypes of Type 1 and 2 processes and frontier in a three­
dimensional conceptual space. (Adapted from Bickle, Mandik and 
Landreth, 2010, Figure 3) 73 
3.2 Illustration of a projection of the position of various processes (one 
shown) along a given continuum (e.g. automatic / controlled, 
where 0% is not controlJed at ail, and 100% is fully controlled) in the 
conceptual space with their classification as Type 1 or Type 2 process, 
showing the grey zone between each type. 73 
LIST OF TABLES
 
Table Page 
2.1 Labels attached to dual-processes in the literature, aligned on the 
assumption of a generic dual-system theory. (From Evans, 2008, 257) ... 34 
2.2 Clusters of attributes associated with dual systems of thinking. (From 
Evans, 2008, 257) 34 
2.3 Characteristics of the X-system and C-system. (From 
Lieberman, 2009, 294) ,.................................................... 48 
RÉSUMÉ
 
Ce mémoire est consacré aux théories à processus duaux, abondamment discutées dans 
la littérature récente en sciences cognitives. L'auteur y propose une version fortement 
amendée de l'approche défendue par Samuels (2009), remplaçant la distinction entre 
'Systèmes' par une distinction entre 'Types de processus', qui permet de critiquer à la fois les 
approches (uniquement) modularistes et les approches décrivant une différence profonde 
entre deux systèmes ayant chacun leurs spécificités (fonctionnelles, phénoménologiques, 
neurologiques). Cependant, dans la version des théories à processus duaux défendue ici, la 
distinction entre 'Types de processus' n'est considérée a priori que comme une distinction 
heuristique permettant aux chercheuses et chercheurs de mieux comprendre l'esprit et d'en 
expliquer certaines propriétés. L'idée centrale défendue dans ce mémoire est que les 
processus cognitifs devraient y être distingués selon leur position dans un espace conceptuel 
multidimensionnel permettant de considérer l'ensemble des caractéristiques et des 
spécificités attribuées à un processus, cela étant préférable à les forcer dans l'un ou l'autre 
des 'Systèmes' ou des 'Types' identifiés dans les approches les plus influentes (cf. 
Evans, 2008). Une fois ce programme de recherche entamé, il sera alors possible de réviser la 
définition des concepts et des catégories utilisés pour refonder certaines notions présentes 
dans la littérature ('module', 'Système 1/2', etc.). L'argument se déroule en trois temps: 
1)
 Le premier chapitre vise à clarifier la notion de 'module' très utilisée en sciences 
cognitives. Contre les approches visant à affaiblir cette notion afin que tous les processus 
de l'esprit soient considérés comme étant des modules, l'auteur - suivant notamment 
Faucher et Poirier (2009) et Samuels (2006) - jette le doute sur l'emploi qui est fait de 
cette notion par plusieurs auteurs très influents, notamment en psychologie 
évolutionniste (par exemple, Barrett, Carruthers, Cosmides, Tooby). 
2)	 L'objectif du second chapitre est de présenter, examiner et critiquer plusieurs théories à 
processus duaux et de suggérer qu'aucune théorie actuellement discutée n'est adéquate 
pour décrire l'architecture de l'esprit. Les approches, particulièrement influentes ou 
représentatives, défendues par Stanovich (1999; 2004; 2009), par Evans (2008; 2009), 
par Lieberman (2007; 2009) et par Carruthers (2006; 2009) y sont abordées. 
3)	 Dans le troisième chapitre, l'auteur critique le cadre développé par Samuels (2009), puis 
développe son approche des théories à processus duaux en montrant certains de ses 
avantages. 
Mots clés: philosophie des sciences, sciences cognitives, psychologie, neurosciences, théorie 
à processus duaux, modularité, module, heuristique, biais, pensée critique, naturalisme. 
ABSTRACT
 
This dissertation is devoted to dual-process theories, widely discussed in the recent 
literature in cognitive science. The author argues for a significantly modified version of the 
account suggested by Samuels (2009), replacing the distinction between 'Systems' with a 
distinction between 'Types of processes,' which allows a critique of both the (only) 
modularist accounts and the accounts describing a deep difference between two systems each 
having their specificities (functional, phenomenological and neurological). In the account of 
dual-process theories developed here, the distinction between 'Types of processes' is 
considered, a priori, only as a heuristic distinction allowing to better understand the mind and 
to explain sorne of its properties. The main idea defended in this dissertation is that cognitive 
processes should be distinguished by their position in a multidimensional conceptual space 
allowing researchers to consider ail of the characteristics and peculiarities attributed to a 
process, which is preferable to accounts forcing the process into either 'System' or either 
'Type' identified in the most influential approaches (cf. Evans, 2008). Once this research 
program is in place, it will become possible to revise the concepts used and the categories 
defined to ground anew sorne of the notions we find in the literature ('module,' 
'System 112,' etc.). The argument is made in three steps: 
1)	 The first chapter aims at a clarification of the notion of 'module' commonly used in 
cognitive science. Against the accounts aiming at a weakening of the notion in order to 
classify ail of the mind's processes as modular, the author - following most notably 
Faucher and Poirier (2009) and Samuels (2006) - casts doubt on how this notion is used 
by many influential authors, particularly in evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barrett, 
Carruthers, Cosmides, Tooby). 
2)	 The objective of the second chapter is to present, examine and cntlclze many dual­
process theories and to suggest that no theory currently discussed is adequate to describe 
the architecture of mind. The accounts, especially influent or representative, suggested 
by Stanovich (1999; 2004; 2009), by Evans (2008; 2009), by Lieberman (2007; 2009) 
and by Carruthers (2006; 2009), are examined. 
3)	 In the third chapter, the author criticizes the framework developed by Samuels (2009) 
before developing his own account of dual-process theories and discussing sorne of its 
advantages. 
Keywords: philosophy of science, cognitive science, psychology, neuroscience, dual-process 
theory, modularity, module, heuristic, bias, critical thinking, naturalism. 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the philosophical tradition conceives the human mind as a unified and rational 
entity that confers human beings superiority over other animaIs. This view has been, and is 
still, tremendously influential in many phi losophical debates, including in many accounts of 
education and of critical thinking. 
For instance, in h is 2005 book Petit cours d'autodéfense intellectuelle, Normand 
Baillargeon has two goals: to make people aware of the importance of thinking critically, and 
to teach this skill by offering a guided tour of the diverse skills necessary to achieve the 
difficult task of thinking critically. Teaching critical thinking, the hardest goal of his book, 
seems simple and is presented as such: first, we teach logic, notions about denotation and 
connotation in language, arguments, fallacies, mathematics, statistics, and so on. Then, the 
students practice these newly acquired skills. The idea of this program is that it will be 
sufficient for them to develop an acute esprit critique and that they will become human 
beings acting and thinking within the standards of rationality if they wish to do so. In other 
words, these tools will allow them to be critical thinkers who can avoid being tricked by 
publicity or fallacies. 
The very attractive picture underlying Baillargeon's implementation of his second goal 
is, sadly, flawed. Moreover, although Baillargeon's implementation, in the end, does not 
produce the results we would want to see, it is representativeof the way critical thinking is 
usually understood. For example, Bailin and Siegel (2003) suggest there are two aspects to 
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critical thinking: the ability and the disposition to think critically, the former referring to the 
acquisition of a skill and the latter, to the virtues possessed by a subjed. 
What these thinkers generally neglect is that acquiring this skill is far more complex than 
what traditional critical thinking and logic textbooks make us bel ieve. Indeed, rational 
thinking is hard for human beings; for example, as the heuristics and biases literature shows, 
it is difficult to apply formai rules or to think along the lines of what is considered rational ­
even when we know how (and are disposed) to do it (cf. Gilovich, Griffin and 
Kahneman, 2002). Nevertheless, even though his methods for teaching it look unpromising to 
contemporary cognitive scientists, Baillargeon's second goal - teaching critical thinking - is 
a very important one and should be investigated further. 
Baillargeon's error, 1 believe, is that he takes for granted that, with practice, it is easy to 
apply the rules once we know them. However, many researchers have shown that the 
problem is not only the lack of knowledge of the rules, but also the lack of knowledge that 
intuitions lead us astray in sorne cases: we must realize we need cognitive tools in certain 
contexts. The idea underlying this dissertation is that not only do we need to properly teach 
how to apply formai rules to a problem, but we also need to make students aware of how the 
mechanisms of the mind processes information in order to make it easier for learners to 
identify and characterize situations in which they must use cognitive tools to override their 
intuitions (and this insight has sorne experimental evidence; e.g. Houdé et al., 2000). 
Stanovich and West (2008) suggested an insightful model of reasoning where they include 
not only the possession of the correct cognitive tools, but also the importance of knowing 
when to apply these mies - what they cali override detection. Explicitly learning this 
'override detection' is only the first step: the students then need to practice and automatize 
this ability and their use of the appropriate cognitive tools (in the right situation). 
l "The primary disposition consists in valuing good reasoning and being disposed to seek reasons, 
to assess them, and to govem beliefs and actions on the basis of such assessment. In addition, most 
theorists outline a subset of dispositions that are also necessary for critical thinking, including open­
mindedness, fair-mindedness, independent-mindedness, an inquiring attitude, and respect for others in 
group inquiry and deliberation." (Bailin and Siegel, 2003, 183) . 
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In order to tackle this hypothesis, and explain why only knowing the rules and how to 
apply them is not enough, there are sorne important issues to consider first as we can both 
understand why we are unable to find the solution to this kind of task easily and how we can 
learn to use the tools of critical thinking adequately. The goal of this dissertation is to 
elucidate one important aspect that serves as a foundation for the framework used by, among 
others, Stanovich and West (2008) to think about these problems and this type of solution. 
Their hypothesis did not appear ex nihilo: their model of reasoning is based upon a family of 
theories becoming very popular in cognitive science: dual-process theories. 
Offering insights into teaching critical thinking is the focal point of my personal overall 
reflections in cognitive science and the philosophies of mind and education, but what 1 will 
discuss here will be in the philosophies of cognitive science and of mind by developing a 
framework in which we can, 1 will argue, 'rethink' dual-process theories. A better grasp of 
cognitive processes should allow us to devise better methods to teach critical thinking. In 
other words, to see how these mechanisms function we need, first, to understand how the 
mind works, and this is precisely the goal of this dissertation, which 1 will achieve by 
evaluating different frameworks allegedly offering a model of the architecture ofmind. 
As mentioned, Stanovich and West's (2008) model is based on a specific account of 
dual-process theories (cf. Stanovich, 2009). These theories are an important family of 
hypotheses that are helpful to understand cognition, and that can help understanding many 
problems encountered in heuristics and biases psychology (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; 
Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich, Toplak and West, 2008). For instance, they allow us to 
understand why sorne biases are systematic. And why they can ultimately be corrected. Yet, 
while important and influential in cognitive science, these theories have a number of 
theoretical problems l wish to examine in this dissertation. 
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1 will develop an account of the mind that could be described as a massive modularity 
hypothesis, influenced by Carruthers' (2006; 2009) vie~. However, most authors, including 
Carruthers, assume that there is at least one other type of processes at work: they suggest that 
there are sorne features of the mind that are not well captured by the idea of a mind strictly 
composed of 'Fodor-modules' (cf. 1.1 for roy definition of this notion), including Fodor 
himself (cf. Fodor, 2000). Dual-process theorists (e.g. Evans, Sioman and Stanovich may be 
the first proponents of the contemporary forro of dual-process theories; for a review, cf. 
Evans, 2008; for an historiai account, cf. Frankish and Evans, 2009), a forrn of weak central 
modularity hypothesis (cf. 1.4), usually speak in terms of System 1 (SI) and System 2 (S2), 
where SI 's processes are evolutionarily old, cognitively-c1osed, autonomous, automatic and 
function in paral1el, and S2's processes are evolutionariJy recent, seriai, are not cognitively 
closed and have the capability of inhibiting the automatic response of SI (cf. Table 2.2 for 
more details). 
For some, like Carruthers, the SI / S2 distinction is a good way to think about the 
processes of the mind, although it does not pick up any deep functional difference3 between 
the two systems. Consequently, after discussing the massive modularity view and the basics 
of dual-process theories, 1 will examine how Type 2 processes are realized. This question is 
indeed a matter of sorne controversy as Carruthers (2006, chapter 4; 2009) views S2 as being 
realized by multiple iterations of SI 's modules, while Lieberman (2007; 2009) suggests that 
there are two systems, c1early divided (which he caUs 'X-system' and OC-system'), both 
anatoroical1y / neurologically and functionally (what 1 will identify as 'deep functional 
difference'). My own view will be in between, as 1 will suggest that both Carruthers' and 
Lieberman's views do not offer a satisfactory explanation of sorne of the data. 
2 This approach to massive modularity is less restrictive than many other accounts; for example, 
Carruthers (2006, chapter 1) argues that Fodor's (1983) definition is too restrictive, while 
Samuels (2006) argues that Carruthers' account is not restrictive enough. 
3 By 'deep functional difference,' 1 mean a difference in the functional architecture of the system 
and not merely a difference in how itfunctions. 
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ln short, 1 will argue, following, then modifying importantly, a suggestion made by 
Samuels (2009), that a dual-process theory using the notion of 'system' cannot be adequate. 1 
will then suggest we should rather conceive dual-process theories as series of continua of the 
different characteristics usually attributed to each system (e.g. automatic / controlled, 
nonverbal/ language bound, associative / rule based). But, even if 1 do not agree with the 
identification of specific systems (and sorne of their attributed characteristics, a subject 1 will 
not discuss here), 1 think there are at least two broadly defined types ofprocesses at work, 
being functionally different. However, those are not fixed: Type 2 processes can become 
Type 1 (cf. 3.3.2). This is one reason the current dual-process theories, including 
Samuels' (2009), could not explain every cognitive process: we need a more comprehensive 
model to integrate ail of the diversity and to explain the complexity of the mind. 
0.1 Outfine ofthis dissertation 
The ideas behind this dissertation are shaped by many discussions in philosophy and 
cognitive science about the architecture of mind, especially evolutionary psychology and the 
psychology of reasoning. The dual-process theories mentioned previously are now widely 
discussed in this literature and, as Evans (2008) observes, most researchers in cognitive 
science seem to suppose - at least impl icitly - one version or another of this type of theories. 
Indeed, many examples are present in the cognitive science literature of the last 30 years. In 
Fodor (1983; 2000), Stanovich (1999; 2004; 2009), Evans (1989; 2008), 
Sioman (1996; 2002), Samuels (2009), Frankish (2004) and even, to a certain extent, 
Carruthers (2006; 2009), to name a few from phiJosophy and from psychology, we can find 
the idea of a mind having two types of processes, or two systems, to explain how the mind, or 
certain processes of the mind, works. These theories have different names, and they are not 
ail identical, but the general idea remains: accounts of the mind that are entirely modular or 
entirely domain-general, i.e. accounts explaining the mind as having only one type of 
processes, are not explanatorily adequate. 
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The aim of this dissertation is to defend a particular account of dual-process theories, 
i.e. an analysis of the mind as composed of different types ofprocesses4 rather than composed 
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of two distinct systems , or of two groups of processes having predetermined characteristics6, 
as most accounts in the literature do (Evans, 2008). 1 will argue that my account solves many 
of the problems currently encountered by these dual-process accounts of the mind. 
In my first chapter, 1 will discuss the notion of'module' widely used in cognitive science 
as the discussions of modularity in general, but mostly the discussions around the nature of 
central modularity, offer interesting insights about what these two parts of the mind might be. 
Sorne of these discussions about modules are very close to many debates on dual-process 
theories, especially the nature of SI or Type 1 processes (moreover, Fodor defends a version 
of dual-process theories). 1 will explain Fodor's (1983) modularity of mind thesis and see 
4 In this dissertation, the term 'process' is meant as a general term that refers to any causal 
sequence that produces a certain output (the 'product'). Sorne processes are not functional, viz. one 
cannot say that it is their function to produce their outputs (e.g. plate tectonics as a process who se 
product is the current geological structure of the earth). Many processes are, of course, functional: 
those made up by humans (e.g. word processing) and those 'designed' by evolution (e.g. digestion or 
respiration). Of course, the processes of concern here will be cognitive processes, viz. processes that 
manipulate, store and transform information in order to help organisms behave adaptively or 
intelligently in their environment. 
In this context, a 'type of processes' refers to a set of processes grouped together because they 
share one or more characteristic that make them theoretically or explanatorily relevant: while each 
process is a token, sorne authors (e.g. Evans, 2008; Samuels, 2009; Stanovich, 2009) argue it is 
possible to regroup sorne of these processes into either one of two types - associated with the 
characteristics usually attributed to System 1 or System 2. 
5 A 'system' is any causally interconnected set of components, from which interaction emerges 
(as described by Wimsatt, 1986) a property or capacity (the systemic property or capacity). The parts 
are interconnected the way they are and the systems have these properties they have for causal reasons; 
for example, in most frameworks under scrutiny here, they have these properties for evoJutionary 
reasons. Systems have a specifie structure (their parts and the way they are interconnected) and a 
certain behavior (way(s) of processing information). Of concern here the dual emergent properties of 
types of cognitive (sub)systems, dubbed 'System l' (automatic, fast, paraIJel, etc.) and 'System 2' 
(controlled, slow, seriai, etc.). In 2.1, 1 will describe how dual-process theories use the notion of 
'system' in more details. 
6 This could be the case if the SI / S2 or Type 1 / Type 2 distinction identified natural kinds. 1 
hope to show we currently do not have sufficient evidence to conciude that they are. 
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how this is an account of dual-process theory where central cognition is not (at ail) modular. 
Then 1 will explore how this notion of 'module' has been used by evolutionary psychologists 
to explain parts of central cognition. Next, 1 will present a recent, more encompassing7, 
account of central modularity, where the mind is entirely modular, defended most notably by 
Carruthers (2006, chapter 1). 1 will finally introduce some of Carruthers' critics and defend 
Samuels' (2006) weak central modularity hypothesis. 
ln my second chapter, 1 will discuss the basics of dual-process theories and argue that 
one consequence of the debates around massive modularity is to adopt one type or another of 
dual-process account of the mind, even for its most ardent defenders8. However, 
Carruthers (2009) takes another path by suggesting that S2 results from the multiple iterations 
of capacities implemented in SI systems. For him, there is no deep functional difference 
between the SI and S2, there are only differences in how the output of a systemfeels like to 
the organism that has the system and how the system is realized. For Carruthers, 
explaining S2 as multiple iterations of capacities implemented in SI systems implies that 
there are no deep functional differences between a cognitive system with only SI capacities 
and one with S2 capacities, but there are differences in how it works (these multiple 
iterations are different than a single iteration of one of SI 's capacities). Moreover, it is this 
'(shallow) functional difference,' how a given process works, what gives rise to 
phenomenological differences. Carruthers' version of the SI versus S2 distinction will be 
contrasted with Lieberman's position: Lieberman believes there are deep functional 
differences between SI and S2 (Cohen and Lieberman, 2010; Lieberman, 2007; 2009; 
Satpute and Lieberman, 2006; see also its presentation by Evans, 2008, 270). He believes 
that SI and S2 are well-defined systems we can c1early identify to specifie neuronal 
activation patterns, and goes as far as to attribute some cognitive capacities to specifie brain 
7 The characteristics Carruthers attributes to modules are weaker, which makes his account - a 
strong central modularity thesis - a more encompassing account of the modularity ofmind. 
8 1 wiJi also highlight that the weak central modularity thesis is more plausible than the 'strong' 
version. 
8 
regions. Both Carruthers' and Lieberman's account are unsatisfying as they fall short of 
explaining a nurnber of cognitive processes. Still, other dual-process theorists are not more 
successful in tempting to describe and explain processes that do not fall in either SI or S2 - 1 
will be interested in accounts defended by Stanovich (2009) and by Evans (2009). 
ln my third chapter, 1 will develop my own account. Contra Carruthers and Lieberman, 1 
will suggest we should cease to use the notion of 'System' altogether when talking about this 
difference (more or less in line with Samuels', 2009 suggestion), and instead speak of Type 1 
and Type 2 processes. However, the characteristics attributed to each 'Type' do not align as 
Samuels (2009) pretends, viz. the dichotomies identified in Table 2.2 do not necessarily 
co-vary and it is possible to find, for example, automatic and controlled processes or others 
that are nonverbal and conscious: for this reason we need a framework where we can take 
this important fact into account. In a nutshell, my view is that to understand the mind, we 
need a series of continua, one for each of the different characteristics posited by dual-process 
theorists, thereby creating a n-dimensional conceptual space (where n is the number of 
characteristics considered) we can use to situate every cognitive process according to its own 
properties. The Type 1 / Type 2 division would thus simply be a shortcut to locate regions in 
this conceptual space where most processes c\uster when their characteristic are plotted in the 
space. 
After arguing for this view, 1 will discuss its three main advantages: it allows us (i) to 
posit complex processes having both Type 1 and Type 2 characteristics (such as one 
discussed by Evans, 2009, but 1 will provide other examples), (ii) to account, conceptually at 
least, for the possibility of processes becoming modularized, i.e. for a Type 2 process to 
acquire some (and even most) characteristics of Type 1 processes (exploring thereby an idea 
suggested, among others, by Karmiloff-Smith, 1992 and also providing a framework for 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus', 1986 observations) and, finally, the conceptual space my view 
introduces (iii) could be very useful for further research. 
ln the end, this emphasis makes this dissertation an essay in the philosophy of cognitive 
science, especiaily in the philosophy of psychology, more than one concerning the 
philosophy of education. 1 strongly believe that the discussion presented more generally in 
9 
this dissertation should not be neglected if we are to make useful recommendations about 
what, when, how and why we are to teach children (or adults!) as knowing more about the 
architecture of the mind can only help us in devising new and better tools. 
0.2 Viewing the mind evolutionarily: the framework 
The argument developed in this dissertation relies, first and foremost, on an evolutionary 
framework. The human body is seen as the result of a long and complex evolutionary 
process, and this claim is not very controversial. For example, sorne features of the human 
body are clear examples of bad (i.e. not optimal) design (retinal blind spot, spine not ideal for 
upright position, esophagus can cause choking, and so on). On this basis, the idea of the mind 
as a unified and rational entity has been challenged, for instance by Marcus (2008). For him, 
not only the human body is a kluge: the human mind also is one. A kluge, in the vocabulary 
of engineers, is a functioning but "clumsy or inelegant" (Marcus, 2008, 2) solution to a 
complex problem. 
In the case of the mind, its engineer, the process of natural selection over small genetic 
mutations, has no goals, a fortiori no goal such as an optimal or elegant solution: only 
survival and reproduction matter to her. If an inelegant solution is efficient, it will be passed 
on. Moreover, as Jacob (1970) observed, natural selection can only work with what it has at 
hand: it cannot redesign a system from scratch. Therefore, the mind is the product of an 
evolutionary development that always occurs on top ofwhat was already there: Marcus talks 
about layers of 'technology,' with the upper layer working with what is in place in the layers 
undemeath. The mind is then viewed as the product of an evolutionary process and, this is a 
key to evolutionary explanations as Dawkins (1986) argues. The structures or capacities 
added might allow for more efficient process, but these processes might be Iimited (or, at 
least, Iimited in certain cases or in certain environments). When studying the mind, 
understood as the result of an evolutionary process, we must then question the assumption 
that a given cognitive process is optimal, or even that the process in question is perfectly 
adapted to its task (as it could be only a by-product, or it could only be partially adapted): it 
10 
must be proven. Additionally, an elegant architecture cannot be presupposed: such a 
discovery is possible (but improbable) but, here again, it cannot be taken for granted. 
Such a view is important because it offers a new insight on what seems to be limitations 
of our mind discussed by psychologists, such as Wason, Evans, Kahneman, Tversky and 
many others (e.g. Bishop and Trout, 2005; Cosmides and Tooby, 2000; Gilovich et al., 2002; 
Marcus, 2008; Stanovich, 1999; 2004; 2009; Stanovich et al., 2008; Stanovich and 
West, 2008). Indeed, this view of the mind as a kluge is in line with the evolutionary 
approaches in psychology by holding that cognition is the product of evolution. The mind is 
made, at least partly, of many modules; as Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research 
Group (1999) suggested. It is an assembly of systems functioning with simple heuristics that 
are good enough in ecological environments, but that produce suboptimal outputs in some 
situations9. 
In the Iiterature, such a framework has appeared under the label of 'evolutionary 
psychology,' and these researchers made much progress to understand the characteristics of 
the human mind. In practice however, their program focuses on the idea ofmodules in a more 
or less Fodorian sense, often without elaborating on other types of processes (cf. 1.2). Many 
researchers question this view and explain cognition with a more flexible framework, and it is 
at the center of this dissertation. Dual-process theories are indeed an alternative much 
discussed in the literature (Carruthers, 2006; Evans and Frankish, 2009; 
Stanovich, 2004; 2009) and my goal is to offer an account that cou Id potentially solve most 
of its current difficulties (as identified by e.g. Evans, 2008; Keren and Schul, 2009; Machery, 
forthcoming, section 8; Samuels, 2009) without 10sing its explanatory power. 
9 Gigerenzer (2007) seems to argue that these situations are scarce; 1 do not agree with this 
position since the environment in which these heuristics are activated is now very different from the 
environment in which this heuristic evolved. It does not mean in any way that these heuristics lost their 
usefulness or their accuracy in a great deal of contexts; it only means that, in many situations, we 
cannat rely on these natural heuristics alone. There are many cultural heuristics (meta-heuristics, cf. 
Wimsatt, 2007) that can help us when these automatic processes go astray (cf. Afterword). 
CHAPTERI
 
DOES THE MIND WORK THAT WAY?
 
MODULARITY AND ITS LIMITS
 
What exactly is a module and what does the modularity hypothesis explain is subject to a 
large amount of controversy. 1 will begin by presenting Fodor's (1983) account of modules 
before assessing what modularity can and cannot explain (Fodor, 2000) by looking at 
discussions about modules in the evolutionary psychology literature. Fodor's influential 
proposai was interpreted in diverse ways, but the most discussed of these is most probably 
the interpretation of modularity made by Evolutionary Psychologists Jo. 
Their suggestion is that central cognition is, at least partly, modular. They introduced, 
with the massive modularity hypotheses, what Samuels (2006) called central modularity 
hypotheses, and which exist in different degrees: 
Strong central modularity: All central systems are domain specifie and/or encapsulated, 
and there are a great many of them. 
Weak central modularity: There are a number of domain specifie and/or encapsulated 
central systems, but there are also nonmodular - domain general and unencapsulated ­
central systems as weil. (Samuels, 2006, 42) 
10 Here, l am mostly referring to the so-called 'Santa Barbara evolutionary psychology school' 
around Cosmides and Tooby, those who Buller calls Evolutionary Psychologists (capital 'E' and 'P,' 
cf. Buller, 2005). 
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This distinction is essential to understand the debates over the nature of modularity. 
Fodor's (1983) account of modularity is different from that of Evolutionary Psychologists on 
many grounds (cf. Faucher and Poirier, 2009), and this is a crucial point. Many Evolutionary 
Psychologists argue that the mind is massively modular, i.e. that most of cognition, including 
a large part of central cognition, is modular. It is important to note that, although there might 
be literally thousands of modules according to sorne of them, they are not suggesting that 
there is nothing else besides modules (cf. Cosmides and Tooby, 1994; Clarke, 2004, 
chapter 1). At least a part of central cognition is modular: they defend an account of weak 
central modularity. 
In the literature on modules however, there are sorne who defend strong central 
modularity hypotheses, such as Barrett (2009; Barrett and Kurzban, 2006) and 
Carruthers(2006; 2009). For them, as Samuels explains, there is nothing other than modules 
that make up the mind. While this might seem implausible given Fodor's characterization of 
modules (cf. 1.1), their strategy - and the initial strategy adopted by Evolutionary 
Psychologists - is to redefine what 'module' means by removing sorne of the characteristics 
Fodor ascribed to them. The general idea is that weaker notions of module can expJain sorne 
aspects of central cognition, up to the point where, even in central cognition, there is nothing 
else besides modules. 
For his part, Fodor insists that modularity can only explain peripheral cognition, viz. that 
it cannat explain any aspect of central cognition (e.g. our capacity to do abduction). In other 
words, for Fodor (1983; 2000), central cognition is not modular to any extent. 
After explaining what Fodor means by 'module,' 1 will explore the strong central 
modularity hypotheses of Barrett (and sorne Evolutionary Psychologists) and Carruthers. 1 
will then criticize Carruthers' account, and suggest that dual-process theories might answer 
many of the problems ofmassively modular accounts of the mind. 
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1.1 Fodor's modularity 
Fodor-modules have nine properties: their operation is domain specifie, mandatory once 
activated (and they are automatic), fast, informationally encapsulated, their processes are not 
eentrally accessible (only their output is), they have shallow outputs, exhibit specifie 
'breakdown patterns' and characteristic pace and sequencing (they have an ontogenetie 
timetable, viz. specifie developmental eharaeteristics), and finally they are associated with a 
fixed neural architecture. 
In this dissertation, 1 will use the notion of 'Fodor-module' to refer to any module 
possessing ail these nine characteristics. However, it is crucial to remember that Fodor states 
explicitly that modules may miss sorne of these characteristics, as it will be critical when 1 
will diseuss dual-process theories in Chapter II. In other words, Fodor is not explicitly 
defending a dual-process aeeount where there are only Fodor-modules and central / higher 
cognition; he rnight allow sorne modules with only sorne of the nine charaeteristics presented 
in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, my goal is not to present each of these 
characteristics in detail (especially since some of these are linked - possibly causal1y - to 
others) but only sorne of them, those that are important to the thesis 1 will develop in this 
dissertation. 
The idea l want to emphasize below is simple: Fodor's account is interesting to explain 
sorne cognitive processes, but certainly not ail of them. Of course, he limits his account to 
peripheral cognition", mostly input systems, by specifying that "[e]ven if input systems are 
domain specifie, there must be sorne cognitive mechanisms that are not" (Fodor, 1983, 101), 
but even those input systems, as 1 will argue, might be more diverse than his strong 
modularity account allows, viz. sorne input systems exhibit sorne non-modular traits (and 
many central processes or systems have modular traits). 
Il As Prinz (2006, 22) notes: "The book would have been more aptly, if less provocatively, called 
The Madularity ofLaw-Level Peripheral Systems." 
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One of the best known and most discussed characteristic of modules is their domain 
specificity. Modules, according to Fodor, are specialized to respond to certain inputs, and 
usually have their own sensory transducers. They are limited to a particular type of inputs, 
and this would be why they are as efficient as they are l2 . Understood in this way, domain 
specificity is problematic on a number of levels. 
The way to determine how many modules there are in the mind depends mostly on what 
is considered to be a domain, Le. it depends on the grain used to analyze, and it also depends 
on what modules are considered to be (Can we identify and distinguish modules 
functionally?, Are modules natural kinds?, etc.). And, once the proper grain is found (if there 
is a way to do so; cf. Prinz, 2006, 27-30 for a sceptical outlook), the jury might still be out to 
find the proper description of a given process (Atkinson and Wheeler, 2004). Vision, for 
example, likely needs an important number of modules to do its task, but should we count 
horizontal line detectors and vertical line detectors as two types of modules, or is it more 
interesting to use the more general c1ass of edge detectors? The description of the visual 
system will likely change in important ways depending of the answer we give here. The 
general idea still remains important: a module answers to (or is activated by) a certain classes 
of inputs, and determining how to find the proper way and the correct level of analysis is 
largely up to empirical research 13 . 
Modules are automatic and mandatory: visual or auditory illusions provide a good 
example of this characteristic. If the appropriate stimulus is presented and seen or heard, the 
illusion will be seen or heard (the McGurk effect, cf. McGurk and Macdonald, 1976, is a nice 
12 An Evolutionary Psychologist would say the input system evolved for solving an evolutionary 
problem, and this is why a given module is specialized (cf. Carruthers, 2006, chapter 1) an idea Fodor 
would probably try to resist (cf. Fodor, 2000; Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010). 
13 For instance, Machery (2009) argues that 'concept' is not a natural kind, i.e. it is not a useful 
generalization in psychology. For him, there are different kinds of structure, different types of modules 
we might say, that are used to do the different tasks traditionally attributed to a more general process. 
Machery's contribution is to show that there are very good reasons to distinguish between 'prototype­
concepts,' 'exemplar-concepts' and 'theory-concepts' and, for him, they are different modular 
processes. 
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example of senses combination). Fodor presents three examples to illustrate his idea: first, if 
someone hears a given utterance in a known language, she will hear a sentence and give it 
meaning; second, any object perceived is perceived in a three-dimensional space; third, 
touching a surface entails feeling it. The first example he gives, as we will see, might be 
problematic (cf. 3.3.2), but this characteristic is otherwise pretty straight forward: it is not 
possible for an unimpaired subject not to see when his eyes are opened, not to feel when he 
touches an object, not to hear when a noise or not to taste or smell when certain molecules 
come in contact with the appropriate receptors, and the same goes for other types of higher 
level modules such as speech recognition (if 1 hear French, 1 will attribute meaning to the 
utterance). 
Modules are fast: once activated, a module usually produces its output weil under a 
quarter of a second. The two important aspects this reveals according to Fodor (1983,63) are 
the contrast between the speed of the modules' processes as opposed to how slow central 
processes can be, and the strong link between speed and their mandatory operation. 
As Fodor explains, sorne of the computational problems we solve automatically, such as 
being able to identify an object against its background, are not necessarily easier or harder 
computational problerns per se than solving a long mathematical equation l4 . He even goes 
further by suggesting that "[t]his dissimilarity between perception and thought is surely so 
adequately robust that it is unlikely to be an artefact of the way that we individuate cognitive 
achievements" (Fodor, 1983, 63), something Carruthers disagrees with (cf. 2.2). The second 
idea, that "processes of input analysis are fast because they are mandatory" 
(Fodor, 1983, 64), is related to the fact that an automatic process does not involve any 
14 The Hrst case can be extremely difficult ta implement in artificial agents, but it is easy to do for 
human beings; the second case is harder for human beings than for artificial agents. 
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decision making process l5 • Reflexes are faster than deciding to do a given action because, 
simply put, "making your mind up takes time" (Fodor, 1983,64). 
The outputs of Fodor-modules are shallow. The notion of shallowness, as applied to 
modules, is ambiguous, both in Fodor (1983, 86-97) and in the literature more generally. He 
sees it as the difference between "observation and inference" (1983, 86), shallow outputs 
being those directly observable whereas non-shallow (deep?) outputs being those that can be 
inferred (e.g. we can directly observe that a traffic signal is red but can only infer that it is 
meant to signal the obligation of stopping). However, he remains vague as to exactly what he 
means by this, and Fodor's vagueness has given rise to a number of distinct interpretations. 
Prinz, for instance, rejects the idea that "[s]hallow outputs are outputs that do not require 
a lot of processing" (2006, 25) because it is not precise enough to create any meaningful 
categorization (what is 'a lot' is not c1ear). Carruthers prefers to understand the idea that 
outputs of modules are shallow as meaning that they are nonconceptual (Carruthers, 2006, 4), 
and this is certainly a strange interpretation of shallowness (e.g. Fodor wouId probably not 
agree with this idea, as even the most basic categories, the primitives, are 'concepts' for him; 
cf. Fodor, 1998, chapter 2). Faucher and Poirier prefer to explain shallowness in terms of 
'basic categories,' viz. categories that do not use background knowledge, categories that are 
simpler representations (Faucher and Poirier, 2009, 287). This view is less controversial, and 
more in line with Fodor's project generally (e.g. Fodor, 1998). This means that we should 
understand shallowness as meaning that the modules' outputs are not theoretically charged 
which seems an interesting way to understand modules' shallowness in the contemporary 
context. By combining aspects of the three views discussed above, we obtain an account of 
shallowness as the fact that the outputs of modules involve no reconceptualization using 
background know1edge because the processes are strongly encapsulated, and this absence of 
reconceptualization is the reason the outputs of module do not require much processing. 
15 "Because these processes are automatic, you save computation (hence time) that would 
otherwise have to be devoted to deciding whether, and how, they ought to be performed." 
(Fodor, 1983,64) 
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Modular processes are not centrally accessible, V1Z. we do not have introspective 
knowledge of their workings. Only their outputs are accessible to other modules or to central 
cognition. This latter characteristic is analogous to informational encapsulation: the 
inaccessibility characteristic specifies that the representations within a module are not 
accessible to central processes, while informational encapsulation tells us that modules 
cannot have (direct) access to the content of central cognition (or that of other modules). For 
example, visual modules do not have access to our knowledge that a given picture is an 
optical illusion (and we cannot consciously affect the inner workings of the module), hence 
the illusion persists and there is no direct way of affecting it. 
Fodor argues modules might be associated with fixed neural architectures 
(Fodor, 1983,98), and that these modules also exhibit specifie ontogenetic sequencing. 
Indeed: during development, sorne capacities appear at specifie moments and in characteristic 
ways. Language acquisition is the best known case, but there seems to be such developmental 
constancy in folk physics, folk psychology, mathematics, etc. Piaget's work is the best known 
on sorne of these questions and, even if his framework is opposed to domain specificity, the 
neopiagetians' framework is not (e.g. Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1996; Gopnik, Meltzoff and 
Kuhl, 2000 16). 
As l already mentioned, many processes have these characteristics according to Fodor, 
but the modularity of mind applies on1y to peripheral cognition. He argues, and insists on this 
idea, that central processes are not and couJd not be modular. For example, central processes 
are argued to be quinean, viz. processes of the central system are taken to be potentially 
sensitive to the whole set of beliefs held by the subject (holism), making these processes 
unencapsulated. Fodor's account is widely debated and many disagree with his view, stating 
it is too restrictive (Carruthers, 2006; Samuels, 2006), sometimes going as far as rejecting 
modularity altogether (Prinz, 2006). 
16 Another example is Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) work, where she offers an interesting perspective 
on modularity, different from Piaget's and Fodor's, which 1 will discuss in 3.3.2. 
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Another account of modularity is however possible: Evolutionary Psychologists began to 
argue for the massive modularity hypothesis, in which even central cognition might be, at 
least partially, modular, an idea against which Fodor argued in his 2000 book. An important 
point is however rarely mentioned: many of these debates are about how to define 'module' 
rather than about modularity itself. 
1.2 Evolutionary Psychology, massive modularity and the many deflnitions 
of 'module' 
Evolutionary Psychologists use the notion of module in the framework of the massive 
modularity hypothesis. The idea, against Fodor's (1983, 2000), is that there is more to 'the 
modularity of mind' than just an explanation of the peripheral systems. Most Evolutionary 
Psychologists adopt one form or another of a central modularity hypothesis. Here we must 
appeal to the distinction made between strong and weak accounts of central modularity at the 
beginning of this chapter. In this section and in the next, 1 will discuss the strong central 
modularity account before suggesting we adopt a weaker central modularity hypothesis 
in 1.4. 
If, in many cases, the weak central modularity thesis seems to be preferred to the more 
restrictive accounts (e.g. Clarke, 2004, chapter 1), according to Barrett, the only essential 
characteristic we should consider when defining 'module' is functional specificity 
(Barrett, 2009, 779). If Barrett's definition is accepted, any process of the mind, if it has one 
(or more) specific function, will be counted as a module, without further consideration as to 
how it works. This, of course, might be seen as problematic since the notion of module would 
thereby lose its very substance: 'module' would then become an uncontroversial notion that 
does not add anything to traditional 'boxology' in psychology (Faucher and Poirier, 2009). 
The problem encountered here is the difficulty of defining what a 'module' is. It remains 
hard to define this term as it is central to many theories, and this difficulty appears c1early 
with Barrett's minimal characterization. 
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This notion is used to talk about a large number of cognitive phenomenon and "not only 
have authors used the term modular to refer to different concepts, but even explicit definition 
of the term by some researchers has been insufficient to avoid subsequent misunderstandings 
by others" (Barrett and Kurzban, 2006, 642). Moreover, there seems to be "no agreement on 
a workable characterization of modules for evolutionary psychology" (Downes, 2008, 
section 3). Still, in aIl instances, modules are seen by Evolutionary Psychologists as 
"adaptations, specific to a domain most of the time" (Faucher and Poirier, 2009, 296, my 
translation). They were selected, through natural selection, for solving adaptive problems 
such asdetecting cheaters in social exchange and recognize kin (these are sorne of the most 
cornmon and discussed examples). 
If the view of modules as merely adaptations were general1y agreed upon by 
Evolutionary Psychologists, the notion of module, as defined in this functional account, 
would lack the explanatory power of a richer notion of module. A very general 
characterization of module will encompass many distinct processes, but, once we identifY one 
such process as a module, we will have very few details on the process in question. A richer 
account however would provide us with much more information once a module is identified. 
The analogy 1 have in mind is the fol1owing: in chemistry, if we identifY a substance as a 
non-metal, we will be able to know sorne of its characteristics, but if we identifY the same 
substance as oxygen, which has a richer definition (including its precise chemical structure), 
we will know a good deal more about the substance in question. 
Of course, as Barrett and Kurzban indicate, modularity in general can help "direc[t] the 
search for specialization," especially in a framework where evolution has a role to play, as it 
"constrains the hypothesis space regarding plausible functions" (2006, 643). Yet, this notion 
is far from the one we began this discussion with and it has nothing left in common with 
Fodor-modules (or even Fodor's account more generally). 
These various changes in the definition of the notion of 'module' used by Evolutionary 
Psychologists might be mostly explained by diverse debates that occurred around Fodor's 
The Mind Doesn 't Work That Way, a clear attack on Pinker's (1997) massive modularity 
hypothesis in the context of Evolutionary Psychology, but also around critical studies of the 
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underlying principles of Evolutionary Psychologists' theories and their assumptions 
(e.g. Buller, 2005; Samuels, 1998). The original research program put fOlward by Tooby and 
Cosmides (199217 ) was ambiguous, to say the least, about what modules are and this lead to a 
series of discussions culminating in a complete dissociation with Fodor's (1983) notion in 
order to adopt a notion closer to Barrett's (2009): 
[. 00] Fodor's (1983) concept of a module is neither useful nor important for evolutionary 
psychologists. For evolutionary psychologists, the original sense of module - a program 
organized to perform a particular function is the correct one, but with an evolutionary 
twist on the concept of function. (Ermer, Cosmides and Tooby, 2007, 153) 
In other words, on this account 'module' does not mean much more than a process that has a 
particular function. If it is the case, and evidence suggests it is, Faucher and Poirier propose 
to Evolutionary Psychologists that they should "simply stop talking about massive 
modu!arity, and rather talk in terms of a mind massively constituted of adaptive structures" 
(2009, 307, my translation and emphasis) because the mainstream use of 'module' ln 
cognitive science still refers to Fodor-modules or similar structures (with less and / or 
modified characteristics). Modules, as defined by Barrett (2009) and by Ermer et al. (2007), 
have a lot less explanatory power and this is an important loss if we are to explain how the 
mind works. 
Carruthers however has developed an interesting account of modules, where he develops 
another kind of strong central modularity to defend Evolutionary Psychologists against 
Fodor's arguments but does not do so by removing ail substance to the notion of 'module,' as 
is the case with Barrett. 
17 While this article in particular, and more generally, the 1992 book (Barkow, Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1992), might not be the absolute tirst presentation of the Evolutionary Psychologists' 
framework, it is arguably its flfst detailed account, and certainly the most influential one 
(e.g. over 2000 citations according to Google Scholar). The earliest presentation of their position is 
most probably Cosmides and Tooby's 1987 article. The primer published online (Cosmides and 
Tooby, 2000) is a more recent presentation of this same research program, where they (still) remain 
vague about what 'module' refers to, although they explicitly refer to Fodor-modules. 
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1.3 Carruthers' account	 of massive modularity: strong central modularity 
and weak modules 
Fodor is clear: we should not (and we could not) understand the m!nd as being only 
modular l8 . Nonetheless, Carruthers (2006; 2009) suggests that, with a weaker account of 
what a module is, we can have a framework where the mind is only composed ofmodules. Of 
course, he agrees that peripheral cognition is modular, but he goes further by arguing that 
central cognition also is entirely modular. A major difference between Carruthers' approach 
and many of the accounts previously discussed is that he argues for massive modularity, 
without relying on an insubstantial characterization such as Barrett's, clearly identifying 
many traits of modules. Moreover, he defends Evolutionary Psychologists by providing a 
philosophically plausible approach to modularity. 
His account is related to the strong central modularity thesis; in fact, in his massive 
modularity account, al! cognitive processes are either modular or emerge from the interaction 
of modular processes. To do so in a plausible way, he weakens the notion of 'Fodor-module' 
by removing sorne of its characteristics and redefining others. In fact, even if his notion is 
richer than Barrett's (2009), the notion he ends up with is so inclusivethat Samuels (2006) 
and Prinz (2006) are not convinced it could be of much use (cf. lA). 
Brief1y, for Carruthers, modules are processing systems, usually associated with a 
functional domain, that are frugal in their operations and are more or less strongly 
encapsulated (he introduces the wide-scope versus narrow-scope distinction, which 1 explain 
below), and by and large, only the outputs of a modular process will be available to other 
processes (Carruthers, 2006, 62-63). However, his account is mostly liberal and allows a lot 
of variability in each of the characteristics attributed to modules. 
18 As a reminder: Fodor (1983; 2000) suggests there needs to be non-modular central processes. 
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Carruthers begins by rejecting some of the characteristics of Fodor-modules, since they 
would be incompatible with any account of central modularity. The shallowness of the output 
is the first rejected by Carruthers, but he also discards speed. Following these modifications, 
he takes as plausible domain-specificity, the mandatory and innate character of modules and 
the neural specificity characteristics, before modifying what is meant by encapsulation and, 
then, add ing frugality. 
Carruthers rejects the shallowness of modules' outputs for an obscure reason. He states 
that if the mind is massively modular as the strong central modularists posit, then there will 
have to be 'conceptual modules I9 ., Then, it will be necessary to explain the outputs of 
'conceptual modules,' since only such outputs can provide the "fully conceptual thoughts or 
beliefs" (Carruthers, 2006, 8) conceptual modules wouId produce as outputs. He is not clear 
as to why this is implied: we could easily imagine conceptually shallow content related to a 
module Carruthers identifies as conceptual, such as kin recognition: recognizing as kin those 
you have seen for long periods of time during childhood can be done 'shallowly.' 1 believe 
the same goes for more complex outputs. Of course, ultimately, conceptual content would 
have to come into the picture, but Carruthers has, 1 believe, to have a solution for this in his 
own framework (cf. 2.2). Of course, if we understand shallowness in terms of 
nonconceptuality (Carruthers, 2006, 4), Carruthers' point can be made easily because it then 
becomes somewhat absurd to characterize ail modules as shallow, and such shallowness 
would not even be compatible with Fodor's own account of what a concept is (cf. 
Fodor, 1998). 
The rejection of 'speed' as a characteristic is clearer: modules are fast, according to 
Fodor, but this characterization only makes sense when the modules' speed is compared to 
the speed of central processes, viz. modules are faster than central cognition. Without any 
such comparison, since both peripheral and central cognition are entirely modular for 
19 Conceptual modules are, for Carruthers, modules dealing with common-sense physlcs or 
biology, or modules used for kin recognition or cheater-detection in social exchanges. As 1pointed out 
previously, mentions ofthese modules are the most commonly found in the literature. 
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Carruthers, it makes little sense of maintaining that modules are fast (or slow) 
(Carruthers, 2006, 9). 
At first sight, it seems domain specificity might also need to go because, in a massively 
modular architecture, sorne modules would need to receive inputs of aJ1 kinds: Carruthers' 
example is practical reasoning (cf. Carruthers, 2004), and such a module could not be 
'domain specifie.' In this context, one could understand domain specificity in functional 
terms (modular processes are restricted to a domain) instead of in terms of content (modules 
have domain specifie content but domain-general processes) as it is usually done20 . We would 
obtain a notion of modularity similar to Barrett's (2009), but more precise (as it possesses 
other characteristics). Although Carruthers agrees modules are systems with "a distinctive 
function, or set of functions" (2006, 62), he prefers to keep domain specificity and he states 
that it is possible to understand practical reasoning as being "underpinned by a whole host of 
different [modular] systems" (Carruthers, 2006, 8), each ofwhich would be domain specifie. 
Still, he is not firm on the necessity ofthis characteristic: while most modules are likely to be 
domain specifie, sorne ofthem could be domain-general (or more general, similar as what he 
suggests for encapsulation, as discussed below). 
Carruthers sees sorne modules, even central ones, as being mandatory since they will 
automatically process any input they receive. Just as it is the case for the perception of one 
line as being longer than the other in the Müller-Lyer illusion, we cannot 'turn off most of 
our faculties. For Carruthers, "most (if not ail) of the component systems that make up the 
human mind are mandatory in this sense [they can't be lurned off al wU!]" (2006, 9), but it 
also leaves the possibility that, for sorne of the components (probabJy just a few), it could be 
possible to interrupt their operation. The exampJe he provides for the mandatory character of 
'higher' modules is mind-reading: seeing an actor being sad on stage gives the impression he 
is sad, even ifwe know he is not. 
20 Content domain specificity allows Samuels (1998) to argue for the plausibility of the Iibrary 
model of cognition (LMC; cf. Carruthers, 2006, section 4.3 for a discussion of the LMC). 
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Innateness and neural specificity are controversial characteristics compatible with 
Carruthers' massive modularity hypothesis, but they are not central to his hypothesis. While 
he tends towards, as he says, "the nativist end of the spectrum" (Carruthers, 2006, 10), this 
position is not necessary for a coherent massive moduJarity hypothesis on his view. Neural 
specificity might be more important, and easier to support empirically as decades of work in 
neuroscience showed that many functions are implemented in particular areas or have 
particular pathways in the brain. There are also sorne important constancies from brain to 
brain (such as the way eyes are wired to the occipital lobe), although the plasticity of the 
brain is one of its most important features (Buller, 2005). The idea of the plasticity of the 
brain can inform massive modularity by specifying that sorne modules are not 'hard-wired' 
but developed through specific attention biases in early childhood (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). 
Still, one could accept these ideas and agree with Carruthers' massive modularity. 
Without firm (content) domain specificity and strong encapsulation, an old problem 
arises for Carruthers' version of the massive modularity hypothesis: the frame problem, a 
problem we necessarily need to solve to have a plausible account of the mind. Briefly, the 
frame problem is the difficulty in AI to limit the information that a system has to consider 
before initiating an action, and to limit the information it has to update once the action is 
accomplished. The best way not to be overwhelmed by ail the options available to a system 
(here: a module), both natural and artificial, is, of course, to give its processes a subset of ail 
possible inputs to compute. That is, cognitive processes must be computationally frugal. 
Encapsulation might be the easiest way to ensure having optimal computationally frugal 
processes, but Carruthers suggest a weaker version of this important characteristic 
(Carruthers, 2006, 57). Indeed, as 1 discussed in introduction (cf. section 0.2), in an 
evolutionary framework, the goal is survival and not the production of optimal outputs. 
Reliable and efficient ones will suffice. 
Encapsulation, for Carruthers, can be either narrow or wide-scope. Narrow-scope 
encapsulation means that "concerning most of the information held in the mind, the system in 
question can 't be affected by that information in the course of processing" 
(Carruthers, 2006, 58). Wide-scope encapsulation, on the other hand, means that "the system 
is such that it can 't be affected by mast of the information held in the mind in the course of 
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its processing" (Carruthers, 2006, 58). The difference here is simply one of degree21 : narrow­
scope encapsulation is more encompassing, and it is the notion typically discussed when it is 
question of modularity. Carruthers argues that wide-scope encapsulation will suffice for his 
notion of modularity, mostly because he believes there is another way to achieve 
computational frugality than using narrow-scope encapsulation: heuristics. 
In very complex situations where the flow of information is too great, having simple 
rules of thumb can help take the best possible decision or make the right choice most of the 
time (Simon, 1957). Of course, these rules of thumb may not always work, they "have been 
designed to be good enough22" (Carruthers, 2006, 54; for a discussion see Gigerenzer, 
Czerlinski and Martignon, 2002); they usually are reliable and efficient. According to 
Carruthers, inspired by the ideas Gigerenzer uses23 (e.g. Gigerenzer, 2007; Gigerenzer 
et al., 1999), this is an alternate solution to the frame problem, different than encapsulation 
(and sometimes more plausible). The best known example of what a heuristic is the 
recognition heuristic (cf. Gigerenzer et al., 1999, chapter 2). In a situation when one has to 
tell which of two cities is the more populous, choosing the city whose name you know, if 
there is just one, is usually a good way to give the right answer. In fact, when choosing which 
of two German cities is the most populous, German students fared poorly compared to 
21 In logical formulation, for the narrow-scope encapsulation, the negation is after the universal 
operator, and it is before the universal operator in the wide-scope encapsulation. Where i stands for 
"information outside of the rnodule's domain" and A(x) for "The system is affected by": 
Narrow-scope: Vi ~A(i) 
(For ail information outside of the module's domain, the system is not affected by it.) 
Wide-scope: ~Vi A(i) == :Ji ~A(i) 
(Not for aIl information outside of the module's domain, the system is affected by it, and it is 
equivalent to there exists information outside of the module's domain that does not affect the system.) 
22 Carruthers implicitly refers to satisjicing, a term coined by Simon (1957). Gigerenzer uses this 
computer science term in an evolutionary context (evolutionary processes seek satisficing, not 
maximizing or optimizing), but the idea behind is the same. 
23 The idea was established in computer science by Newell and Simon (1976, section 2). Just as it 
is the case with Simon's notion of satisficing, Gigerenzer adds an evolutionary f1avor to the term in 
order to use it in the context of an evolutionary explanation of the mind. 
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American students given the same question, because the latter were able to use the 
recognition heuristic (and American students' results were poorer than German students' 
when asked about cities in the United States). This research program has had important 
empirical results and applications: in medical diagnosis, for exampJe, decision trees 
elaborated with two or three simple and quick questions usually lead, when weil designed, of 
course, to better results than complex decision algorithms using much more information 
(Breiman, Friedman, Olshen and Stone, 1984, chapter 6). In these heuristic decision 
processes, no other information is needed, and the output is reliable (moreover, with 
engineered heuristics, sometimes the output is the best output possible, cf. Gigerenzer, 2007, 
chapter 9). 
Carruthers argues that, instead of being encapsulated in the Fodorian sense, modules may 
just implement simple heuristics rules leading to fast and reliable outputs, and this is exactly 
what wide encapsulation captures. A given module can consult information from / in other 
modules, and this does not lead to informational explosion because it implements search 
heuristics that make the search frugal Uust as Newell and Simon, 1976 argued). As 
Carruthers puts it: "[Evolution] wi Il favor a satisficing strategy, rather than an optimal 
one [... ] [and it] will favor a variety of search heuristics that are good enough without being 
exhaustive." (2006, 54) 
Then aga in, this particular characterization of modules does not mean ail modules have 
only the minimum to satisfy Carruthers' account. Sorne modules may actually have ail the 
characteristics of Fodor-modules. But, and this is a point Carruthers emphasize, in the context 
of the massive modularity hypothesis, some of the characteristics attributed to these 'strong' 
modules must be removed in order to include ail possible processes of the mind as being 
modular, even when they do not fit perfectly in the 'original' definition of 'module.' 
In the end, Carruthers proposes his weakened notion of modules in order to integrate ail 
cognitive processes and assign to them sorne of the characteristics of modules in a 
meaningful way. To use again the chemical analogy made earlier, it is as we had a number of 
nonmetals (cognitive processes), sorne of which we could identify as oxygen 
(Fodor-modules), others as arsenic (central modules, as we will see in 1.4), but we refused to 
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make the distinction between oxygen and arsenic in order to only have one notion to explain 
ail of non-metal chemistry. His definition of massive modularity goes like this (this very long 
quote is necessary to capture the details given by Carruthers): 
Each of these systems will have a distinctive function, or set of functions; and each will 
have a distinct neural realization [ ... ]. AIl ofthese systems will need to be frugal in their 
operations, hence being encapsulated in the wide-scope sense, at least [... ]. Moreover, 
the processing that takes place within each of these systems will generally be 
inaccessible elsewhere. [... ] Thus construed, the thesis of massive modularity doesn't 
require that the mind should be composed of systems that are encapsulated in the 
traditional narrow-scope sense (although many might be). Nor need aIl ofthese systems 
be domain specifie in their output conditions (although most are likely to be). And while 
modules are function-specific, their algorithms needn't be [... ]. In addition, while many 
modules will be significantly innate, or genetically channeled, many will be constructed 
through some sort of (probably modular) learning process. [... ] l shou Id stress, 
moreover, that there is nothing in these considerations to suggest that modules will be 
elegantly engineered atomic entities with simple and streamlined internai structures. 
(Carruthers, 2006, 62, my emphasis) 
Yet, Samuels (2006) and Prinz (2006) are not satisfied with Carruthers' account, mostly 
because, in their view, its flexibility (I emphasized this flexibility in the quote above) renders 
the notion too weak to be controversial or philosophically interesting to any extent. 
1.4 Samuels' account of massive modularity: weak central modularity and 
stronger modules 
For Prinz (2006) and Samuels (2006), indeed, Carruthers' notion of module is so much 
weaker than Fodor's original thesis (1983), and also than most other accounts of modularity, 
that it does not say anything interesting or controversial about how the mind works. For 
Prinz, Carruthers' view is a mundane affirmation with very little theoretical consequences ­
for instance, it cannot help us refine theories or research paradigms. This criticism of 
Carruthers is similar to the one 1 made in 1.2 of Barrett's (2009) account of modularity. 
However, Samuels is more charitable, and he observes that 
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[o]n sorne readings, the MM hypothesis is plausible but banal. On other readings, it is 
radical but wholly lacking in plausibility. And on still further (more moderate but still 
interesting) interpretations, it remains largely unsupported by the available arguments 
since there is little reason to suppose that central systems - such as those for reasoning 
and decision making - are modular in character. (Samuels, 2006,37) 
The first approach he focuses on is Barrett's reading of the massive modularity hypothesis. 
The second is a version of the strong central modularity thesis where ail the modules are 
Fodor-modules24 , and the third identifies Carruthers' strong central modularity account with a 
weakened, but not wholly detlated, notion of module. This section will discuss a fourth 
reading of the massive modularity hypothesis, as developed by Samuels (2006). 
Samuels (2006) defends a more traditional (closer to Fodor's) definition of module, but 
also advocates the adoption of a weak central modularity thesis. He suggests that the notion 
of Fodor-module might be adequate to understand many cognitive processes, but that we 
should also concede that sorne processes do not have the most important characteristics of 
Fodor-modules, such as domain specificity, encapsulation or cognitive penetrability. 
He justifies his position by arguing that there is little support for massive modularity 
hypotheses advocated by the strong central modularity thesis, but that it would be an error to 
thereby conclude, as Prinz (2006) does, "that minds are not rnodular to any interesting 
degree" (Samuels, 2006, 52). There are, he believes, very good reasons to think that many 
peripheral processes are modular and, similarly, that it wou Id be untenable to argue that it is 
not possible for any central processes to be modular, at least, to sorne degree. Regarding the 
extent of modularity, his solution is a middle ground between Carruthers (2006) and 
Prinz (2006), and this middle ground is, more or less, a return to a Fodor-like account of the 
mind, that is an approach we can identify with dual-process theories. For Samuels, 
Carruthers' account is unsupported by the current data and, according to what 1 developed 
in 1.3, it also has a problem similar to the one Samuels attributes to Barrett's account (2009). 
24 Evolutionary psychologists were believed to defend such an account (cf. Fodor, 2000), but they 
have since clarified where they are standing (cf. 1.2). 
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Then again, Prinz' complete rejection of modularity is not plausible (especially if we are to 
adopt a weakened notion of 'module'). 
Samuels believes there is "considerable evidence for relatively low-level modular 
mechanisms" (2006, 45), but that most data in favor of central modularity is interpreted as 
such in light of theoretical arguments in favor of massive modularity hypotheses he does not 
endorse (cf. Samuels, 2006, 42-45). Simpler, peripheral, processes might be able to explain 
the same data as does the central modules introduced by the advocates of massive modu larity 
hypotheses. The clearest example is certainly the way the Wason selection task is used in 
order to argue in favor of a cheater detection module while there might be different 
explanations for the results obtained, such as perceptual biases (this is, of course, a much 
debated issue; cf. Clarke, 2004, chapter 4; Evans and Over, 2004, chapter 5; Houdé 
et al., 2000; Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2008, chapter 3). 
Moreover, sorne cognitive phenomena are difficult to explain without central 
(i.e. nonmodular) processes, making the case for a strong central modularity thesis very 
difficult. There is clear evidence we can combine and integrate concepts from different 
domains (defined in terms of function or in terms of content), use our background knowledge 
to make good inferences (inferences to the best explanation, abduction; cf. Fodor, 2000, 
chapter 3), there is also strong covariance between performance in different cognitive 
domains25, and, finally, sorne disorders have an effect on ail of central cognition (such as 
general mental retardation, e.g. Down's syndrome26), etc. There is also neural evidence for 
domain-general control mechanisms, consolidating Samuels' position 
25 Cf. Stanovich and West (2008,686, table 8) for a list of the tasks and effects that correlate with 
cognitive abilities and those that do not. 
26 Samuels is aware that the existence of general mental retardation by itself does not prove the 
existence of nonmodular central systems. In spite of this, general mental retardation is most probably 
the least interesting of the points he makes. Still, it does not undermine his argument since what he 
c1aims is that "taken together, [the phenomena mentioned above] do strongly suggest the existence of 
nonmodular - domain general and unencapsulated - mechanisms for thought," (Samuels, 2006, 48) 
and these phenomena are compatible with weak central modularity hypotheses. 
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(Krug and Carter, 2010; Cohen and Lieberman, 2010). While these arguments do not 
guarantee that central cognition is not modular to any extent (versions of the weak central 
modularity thesis could still be plausible), the onus is on the 'strong central modularists' to 
explain these diverse observations about the alleged centrality of some cognitive processes. 
Samuels is quite harsh: 
( ... ] the prospects of accommodating the above phenomena without positing nonmodular 
mechanisms appear bleak; and in view of the lack of argument for MM, l'm inclined to 
think the effort of trying to do so is, in any case, wasted. (Samuels, 2006, 48) 
While the solution is not to get rid of modularity altogether, Samuels' suggestion in the 
end is to adopt a middle ground, where there are clear instantiations of modules in the strong 
Fodorian sense (e.g. low-Ievel perceptual modules) and nonmodular central processes (that 
might be modular to a small extent in many cases, in accord with the weak central modular 
thesis). Samuels is clear: "The situation is, in other words, much as Fodor advocated over two 
decades ago (FOOor, 1983)." (Samuels, 2006, 52) 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, 1 discussed the notion of 'module' and emphasized some of its 
controversial aspects. Strong central modularists argue for a version of massive modularity 
where the mind is only modular but, as 1 argued, they do not offer a satisfactory account as 
the notion of 'module' they use is either too weak and not very interesting, or too strong and 
not plausible. Some theorists however have suggested a very promising middle ground, 
between 'module nihilism' (à la Prinz, 2006) and strong central modularity: the weak central 
modularity hypothesis. By using a weakened notion of 'module' but accepting that there are 
also central processes that are no! entirely modular, these theorists offer a more plausible 
account for the architecture of mind. This account is very similar to the approach identified 
by Clarke (2004) as the one defended by Evolutionary Psychologists (since, it seems they 
have abandoned such an account, cf. Ermer et al., 2007). 
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What would such an account look like? Fodor, as 1 discussed quickly at the end of 1.1, 
thinks central cognition must be nonmodular: in this sense, he advocates one account of dual­
process theories, where the two systems are input and output modules and central (or higher) 
cognition. While, as we will see in the next chapter, Stanovich, an important proponent of 
dual-process theories, seems to advocate such a position, he takes good care of elaborating a 
weaker notion of 'module' than the one described by Fodor (Stanovich, 2004, 37-44). It is 
indeed quite hard to develop an account where central cognition is not modular to anyextent, 
and where peripheral cognition respects most of Fodor's criteria. Weak central modularity is 
promising in this respect: it has the important advantage of being more flexible than other 
accounts of modularity, especially the strong central modularity hypothesis. This hypothesis 
can also be seen as another label for sorne forms of dual-process theories, where there are 
both modular and nonmodular processes, divided along two systems (S 1 is mostly modular, 
S2 is mostly nonmodular). 
Samuels (2006) suggests a similar avenue and, in his more recent work (2009), he takes 
the idea of dual-process theories very seriously. However, there are still sorne problems with 
dual-process theories as they currently stand, and these problems will be the subject of the 
next chapter. 
CHAPTERII
 
CAN THE MIND BE DIVIDED INTO (ONLY) TWO SYSTEMS?
 
A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES:
 
In this chapter and the next, l will argue that there are at least two types of processes 
within the mind, one we can associate with Fodor-modules (even if Fodor-modules might not 
be the best existing characterization of these processes), and one we can associate with 
central processes (here, too, Fodor's characterization might not be the best). This difference 
is both functional and phenomenological (maybe neurological too), but there is more to it: 
there are, l will argue, two clusters of processes, each sharing a large set of characteristics, 
within the mind. These clusters however are not 'systems,' but there is still an important 
distinction to make between the two types of processes: in this sense, there are deep 
functional differences between them. In Chapter III, 1 will develop my account of dual­
process theory in detail, but l will first, in this chapter, survey sorne of the existing dual­
process accounts of the mind. 
l will briefly overview what is meant by 'dual-process theories' by exploring ideas like 
Stanovich's (1999; 2004), but also by exploring how diverse are theories regrouped under 
this 'dual-process' label. Afterwards, l will explain and criticize Carruthers' (2006; 2009) 
account of dual-process theories. For him, there are no processes of the mind that cannot be 
characterized by what is labelled as 'System l': the components of SI are the modules of his 
massive modularity hypothesis. l will retum to sorne key points of 1.4 and offer sorne 
evidence as to why we should doubt Carruthers' explanation of S2. Then, l will look at 
Lieberman's (Lieberman, 2007; 2009) version of dual-process theories. For Lieberman, there 
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are two systems to be distinguished: the reflexive system (X-system) and the reflective 
system (C-system). While interesting, l will show that Lieberman's account is inadequate as 
it is too rigid to explain many mental processes. l will finally suggest that, generally, there are 
important problems with how dual-process theories are currently advocated, and that it is 
necessary to adopt a different perspective, where the notion of system, which is too rigid to 
offer an adequate explanation, is abandoned (following Samuels, 2009). As mentioned, l will 
tentatively suggest one such account in Chapter III. 
2.1 Briefoverview ofdual-process theories 
Evolutionary psychologists27 try to understand how the mind works in an evolutiooary 
framework and their perspective has brought about many changes in how we conceive and 
think about the human mind. As explained in 0.2, understanding the mind as a set of 
processes able to work flawlessly and giving the right output each time cannot be right: the 
mind is a kluge, a kluge resulting from the processes of evolution by natural selection. 
Dual-process theories can account for this kluggish arrangement of processes (two systems 
having their own specificities and sometimes being in conflict) within the mind. 
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the names attributed to each type of system in different 
dual-process theories and Table 2.2 gives an idea of the characteristics usually attributed to 
each. 
27 1 am not referring to Evolutionary Psychologists, as 1 did in Chapter 1. 1 am talking here about 
psychologists working in an evolutionary perspective in general (cf. Buller, 2005; Marcus, 2008, 6-9; 
Stanovich, 2004, chapter 5) as 1 did in 0.2. 
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Table 2.1
 
Labels attached to dual-processes in the Iiterature, aligned on the assumption of a generic dual-system
 
theory. (From Evans, 2008, 257)
 
1References System 1 System 2 
Fodor (1983,200[0]) Input modules Higher cognition 
Schneider & Schiffrin (1977) Automatic Controlled 
Epstein (1994), Epstein & Pacini (1999) Experiential Rational 
Chaiken (1980), Chen & Chaiken (1999) Heuristic Systematic 
Reber (1993), Evans & Over (1996) Implicit/tacit Explicit 
Evans (1989,2006) Heuristic Analytic 
Sloman (1996), Smith & DeCoster (2000) Associative Rule based 
Hammond (1996) Intuitive Analytic 
Stanovich (1999, 2004) System 1 (TASS) System 2 (Analytic) 
Nisbett et al. (2001) Holistic Analytic 
Wilson (2002) Adaptive unconscious Conscious 
Lieberman (2003) [and Marcus, 2008] Reflexive Reflective 
Toates (2006) Stimulus bound Higher order 
Strack & Deustch (2004) Impulsive Reflective 
Table 2.2
 
Clusters ofattributes associated with dual systems ofthinking. (From Evans 2008, 257)
 
. ~System 1 1 System 2 1 
Cluster 1 (Consciousness) 
Unconscious (preconscious) Conscious 
Implicit Exp!icit 
Automatic Controlled 
Loweffort High effort 
Rapid Slow 
High capacity Low capacity 
Default process lnhibitory 
Holistic, perceptual Analytic, reflective 
Cluster 2 (Evolution) 
Evolutionarily old Evolutionarily recent 
Evolutionary rationality Individual rationality 
Shared with animais Uniquely human 
Nonverbal Linkedto language 
Modular cognition Fluid intelligence 
Cluster 3 (Functional characteristics) 
Associative Rule based 
Domain specifie Domain general 
Contextualized Abstract 
Pragmatic Logical 
Parallel Sequential 
Stereotypical Egal itarian 
C1uster 4 (Individual differences) 
Universal Heritable 
Independent of general intelligence Unked to general intelligence
 
Independent ofworking memory Umited by working memory
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Generic dual-process theorists typically use the labels System 1 (S 1) and System 2 (S2) 
to identify two clusters of processes: SI is understood as a group of many subsystems 
(cf. Stanovich, 2004) that function in parallel and are qualified as automatic, unconscious and 
fast while S2 is a domain-general system qualified with the 'opposite' characteristics. Of 
course, this brief categorization is heuristic: the distinction between each system is rarely 
made so clearly, and researchers do not agree on how to divide and distinguish each system 
(Evans, 2008; 2009). 
There are too many accounts in the literature to discuss ail of them (cf. Table 2.1). 
However, sorne are more salient or representative and sorne better illustrate 'extreme' 
versions of dual-process theories than others. Carruthers' (2006; 2009) and 
Lieberman 's (2007; 2009) accounts are good examples of extreme versions, while 
Evans' (2008; 2009) and Stanovich' (1999; 2004; 2009) are probably the most influential. 
The idea behind many dual-process theories is the following. For sorne evolutionary 
minded psychologists, as we saw in 1.2 and 1.3, the mind is massively modular, and each of 
these modules is a system that evolved in parai lei with the others (cf. Carruthers, 2006, 12-28 
for a detailed account of this 'argument from design'). Whether they accept the massive 
modularity hypothesis as advocated by Carruthers (2006) or Barrett (2009) or not (1 do not, 
cf. 1.2, 1.3, lA and 2.2), most researchers accept at least that there is an important set of 
modular processes within the mind. Understood in this wide sense, modular processes are 
systems using (mostly simple) heuristics working weil in their ecological environment 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999) but that can sometimes produce less adapted responses, especially 
when applied out oftheir normal range, because oftheir inherent Jimits - from the standpoint 
of evolution by natural selection they do not need to be optimized: satisficing is enough. Our 
minds are environmentally bounded, viz. "the most important bounds that shaped our 
evolving rationality were not internaI, mental factors, but rather externat, environmental 
ones" (Todd, 200 1, 52), and this idea is crucial if we are to understand how the mind actually 
works. 
Some of these limits are studied by the heuristics and biases research program in 
psychology, and these heuristics psychologists offer a great deal of evidence in favor of 
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dual-process theories of cognition (Evans, 2003). In fact, according to Stanovich et al., the 
tasks in this literature were specifically designed "to pit a heuristically triggered response 
against a normative response generated by the analytic system [S2 / Type 2 
processes]" (Stanovich et al., 2008, 254). 
Kahneman and Tversky - the initial proponents of this research program - discovered 
that cognitive biases are not random: they follow a pattern because the mind relies on specific 
'innate rules of thumb' (S 1 / Type 1 processes), the heuristics Gigerenzer refers to, to 
produce its outputs. Thus, it is possible to design tasks in which these rules of thumb produce 
errors instead of their usual 'good response.' However, we also have deliberate and slow 
processes allowing us to find the right answer. This is, according to Stanovich et al. (2008), 
an important source of evidence in favor of dual-process accounts of the mind. Kahneman 
and Frederick agree and state: 
The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their 
intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the 
slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute. (Kahneman and 
Frederick, 2005, 267) 
Dual-process theories like the ones referred to in the above paragraph abound in the 
literature, both in cognitive and social psychology. Evans (2008, 263) identifies three main 
currents: dual-process theories of reasoning, dual-process theories of judgment and decision 
making, and dual-process theories of social cognition. The first one is concerned with 
deductive reasoning, and tasks like the Wason card selection task and the belief bias 
paradigm28 . The second includes, among others, the study of heuristics and biases 
(cf. Gilovich et al., 2002) and that of the decision trees mentioned in 1.3. The third is one of 
the dominant paradigms in social cognition and is concerned with "the automatic and 
unconscious processing of social information" (Evans, 2008, 268) such as stereotypes and 
related attitude changes. 
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Here, l will be mostly interested in "attempts [... ] to map various dual-process theories 
into a generic dual-system theory" (Evans, 2008, 256) rather than in a specific perspective on 
dual-process theories. One such attempt towards a generic dual-process theory is 
Stanovich's (1999; 2004; 2009). 
System 1 and System 2 (or Subsystems 1 and 2; e.g. Leslie, 1994;. Scott and 
Baillargeon, 2009) have various characteristics, and names, attributed to them, but the 
general idea remains basically the same (cf. Tables 2.1 and 2.2). As mentioned in 
Chapter l (1.1 and 1.5), Fodor (1983; 2000) is a dual-process theorist, even if he does not 
actively endorse the label, so is Carruthers (2006; 2009), hence the importance of their 
account of modularity - as it defines what their 'System l' is. Many such accounts of the 
mind exist and they share at least two tenets, as Samuels (2009) explains. First, the 
distinctions made in Table 2.2 (or its variant a given author prefers) align, viz. "processes 
which exhibit one property from a colurnn typically, though not invariably, possess the 
others" (Samuels, 2009, 131). For example, in Fodor's (1983) account, modules having one 
of the nine characteristics possess the others in most cases (but it could have only five out of 
nine). Second, the processes are taken to be part of either SI or S2 - to use Fodor's account 
again, a process is either modular or part of central cognition. For now, l will explore 
Stanovich's account of dual-process theories as it is very influential in the literature, probably 
more so than Sioman's (1996; 2002). 
For Stanovich (2004), SI is in fact a great deal of systems that he identifies more or less 
with Fodor-modules, and which he calls collectively 'The Autonomous Set of 
Systems' (TASS). His TASS "refers to a (probably large) set of systems in the brain that 
operate autonomously in response to their own triggering stimuli, and are not under the 
control of the analytic processing system [S2]" (2004, 37) and many of its processes are 
modular. However, by modular he means something "less restrictive and therefore less 
28 Valid and invalid syllogisms with familiar or unfamiliar content. For example, if we present 
familiar content that makes sense to a subject, he is very likely to judge the syl10gism valid even if it is 
not. 
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controversial than most conceptions of modularity ln cognitive science" 
(Stanovich, 2004, 37). Basically, he rejects most of the characteristics of Fodor-modules and 
qualifies the systems of TASS as "fast, automatic and mandatory" (Stanovich, 2004, 40). 
Stanovich's TASS processes are not necessarily innate - sorne of them can be acquired 
through learning29 -, associated with fixed neural architecture or specifie ontogenetic 
sequencing. His notions of encapsulation and impenetrability are defined more loosely 
(cf. Stanovich, 2004, 282). TASS processes work in parallel and sorne manipulate higher­
level inputs and outputs30 (but most do not). Finally, there is no conscious experience 
associated with TASS' operation (but its output can be conscious). Face recognition, theory 
of mind, fear, naïve physics, folk biology, child care, etc. are listed as 'cognitive modules' by 
Stanovich (2004, 44, table 2.2) and they are ail part of what he considers to be TASS 
processes. 
S2, for its part, has the converse characteristics: so, while parallelism, automaticity, 
domain specificity, low effort and unconscious characters of the processes are defining 
features of TASS / SI, S2 is seriai and has "central executive control, conscious awareness, 
capacity-demanding operations, and domain generality in the information recruited to aid 
computation" (Stanovich, 2004, 44-45). Its most important features are certainly its central 
raIe in cognitive control and its ability to inhibit and override TASS' outputs with rule-based 
processes; in Stanovich's own words: "[ ... ] the analytic system allows us to sustain the 
powerfu\ context-free mechanisms of \ogical thought, inference, abstraction, planning, 
decision making, and cognitive controL" (Stanovich, 2004, 47) 
In a more recent version of his theory, Stanovich (2009) replaces SI and S2 with Type 1 
and Type 2 processes, divided among three 'minds,' three systems he identifies as the 
29 While Stanovich mentions this as a possibility (Stanovich, 2004, 38 & 42), he does not 
elaborate on his idea of a part of S2 acquiring autonomy, and it is not clear bow it is made possible in 
the way he describes his S2 and in how he develops his dual-process theory. 
30 In otber words, the inputs and outputs ofTASS processes are not necessarily shallow. 
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autonomous mind (only Type 1 processes, it is the same as TASS), the algorithmic mind and 
he reflective mind31 . The main interest of this distinction is to explain some experimental 
results (e.g. Stanovich and West, 2008) according to which S2 works in different ways 
depending on the task. However, Type 1 and Type 2 processes keep the characteristics 
Stanovich previously associated with SI and S2. Examples of Type 1 processes are the TASS 
processes mentioned above, and S2 processes are divided between the algorithmic and the 
reflective minds. This difference between his two accounts does not imply much for 
Stanovich's architecture of the mind: the important thing to keep in mind for our purposes is 
that the processes identified are still grouped in systems. The difference is that they are 
grouped into three systems instead oftwo, because his two systems account was not handling 
sorne of his rnost recent research data very weil (e.g. Stanovich and West, 2008; West, 
Toplak and Stanovich, 2008; cf. 2.4.1 for more details). 
A parallel can be made here with the idea of the mind as a kluge from section 0.2: if the 
mind is a kluge, it is very improbable that the distinction between SI and S2 can be made as 
neatly as most dual-process theorists pretend. 1 hope to show, in what follows in this chapter, 
that the assumption of such a neat division is misleading, and that the mind is probably not 
nicely divided in two types of processes. 
31 Stanovich (2009) divides the S2 of his previous account (2004) into two distinct systems: the 
algorithmic mind and the reflective mind. 
The algorithmic mind refers to the information processing part of S2: Stanovich's examples are 
"input coding mechanisms, perceptual registration mechanisms, short- and long-term-memory storage 
systems [and access to them]" (Stanovich, 2009, 29, my emphasis). It explains how sorne tasks are 
processed, but not the reasons why. The reflective mind, answering the why part, contains the goals and 
beliefs associated with that goal. In Stanovich's words: "It is only at the level of the reflective mind 
that issues of rationality come into play. Importantly, the algorithmic mind can be evaluated in terms 
of efficiency [with IQ tests] but not rationality." (Stanovich, 2009, 30) 
In his book, Stanovich mostly emphasizes what IQ test measure. For him, the algorithmic mind is 
responsibJe for the differences in general intelligence (IQ), and the reflective mind, for the difference 
in rational thinking dispositions (Stanovich, 2009, 33-34). This model helps him exp!ain why the 
differences between cognitive abilities (as measured by IQ tests) and rationality (as measured by 
success to certain tasks) do not correlate for sorne tasks used to test the abilities associated with critical 
thinking and rationality (Stanovich and West, 2008). 
40 
This, l believe, points towards an important problem of dual-process theories as they 
currently stand. Before elaborating on these problems in 2.4, l will explore two 'extreme' 
versions of dual-process theories. First, Carruthers' account where there is no proper 82 to 
speak of; second, Lieberrnan's account where there are two systems having their own 
neuronal architecture (or, at least, their own neural activation patterns). 
2.2 Carruthers and the multiple iterations ofSystem 1 processes 
As l described in 1.3, Carruthers (2006; 2009) argues that the mind is more than 
massively modular: it is entirely modular, viz. there is no cognitive structure in the mind 
other than modules (as he characterizes them). As a consequence, there is no deep functional 
difference, he believes, in the components realizing S 1 or S2: the same components underlie 
both 'systems,' although different properties can emerge from their activity. 82, for 
Carruthers, is realized in multiple iterations, in cycles, of SI activity, "rather than existing 
alongside the latter" (Carruthers, 2009, 112). 
According to him, the distinction between SI and S2 does exist at a functional and at a 
phenomenological level (but only at those two levels), where each system has different 
properties, the most distinctive being phenomenological. SI is fast and unconscious and S2 is 
slower - since the cycles of SI processing take time - and conscious, following the ideas of 
the global workspace theory suggested by Baars (1988; 1999), for who consciousness is the 
means by which modules are recruited in the global workspace that gives rise to the 
functional properties of S2. According to the global workspace account, inputs are processed 
by the modules that can do it, and their output is delivered to the global workspace, a kind of 
mental blackboard where outputs are made available to other modules (Poirier, in 
preparation). Once published, the outputs are processed by other modules that, in tum, 
process them as a new input before publishing a new output on the blackboard. This process 
continues until a solution is found or until the focus of attention changes (e.g. new inputs 
come in). 
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For Carruthers, action-rehearsal and utterances in inner speech (he insists on the 
importance of language) are what make possible the emergence of S2 out of cycles of SI 
processing, and it explains why S2 processing is specifie to humans32 (as language is unique 
to humans). He believes that S2 "is realized in sequences of action-schema activations (often 
rehearsals of natural language utterances), with the sequences taking place (sometimes) in 
accordance with learned rules and inferential procedures" (Carruthers, 2006, 256-257). These 
multiple iterations of S1 processes are what give rise to conscious experience, thereby giving 
us the impression that two systems, or two types of processes, are at work. Multiple iterations 
are also what explain how conceptual content arises and, more importantly, why S2 
operations are seriai, as "only one action can be mentally rehearsed and globally broadcasted 
at a time" (Carruthers, 2009, 120). 
Carruthers believes it is an advantage of his view that it removes "any need to regard 
System 1 and System 2 as distinct" (Carruthers, 2009, 120) in the deep functional sense. The 
distinction between SI and S2 is replaced with his weak notion of module, encompassing ail 
of the mind's processes, and he replaces S2 with the global workspace and multiple iterations 
of his modules. His account however has sorne shortcomings. 
First, it is important to note that, as we saw in 1.3, Carruthers' notion of 'module' can be 
criticized as being 100 weak: he is not very strict about what counts as a module and he thus 
removes most of the explanatory advantages the notion cou Id have in a framework where it is 
defined more precisely (cf. 1.3). Yet, his account of the SI / S2 distinction can only work if 
one accepts this weakened notion - which 1 do not for reasons put forth previously. 
Nonetheless, l will argue below that, even if we accept his notion of module, his account of 
32 Action-rehearsal is described as possible for chimpanzees and Homo ergaster (or erectus) 
(Carruthers, 2009, 114), but Carruthers is not clear what makes S2 specifically human. Of course, 
inner speech is part of the answer but it only consists in "rehearsal of speech actions [that] gives rise to 
imagery" (Carruthers, 2009, 117). This is a problematic assumption made by Carruthers in his 
framework, but 1do not have the space to discuss it in details here. Briefly: an important feature of the 
framework 1 will develop in Chapter 3 will allow me to consider the 'linked to language' line of 
Table 2.2 in a broader framework where being linked to language is only one characteristic among 
many others (cf. footnote 44, p. 63). 
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the SI / S2 distinction encounters two major difficulties: 1) explaining executive control as 
well as 2) accounting for various observations in neuroscience that suggest the existence of 
central / nonmodular processes. 1t also appears that his most original claims are predictions, 
none of which are currently confirmed (see below; also, Samuels, 2006 makes a similar 
claim). 
About this last remark: Carruthers specifies that adopting his account of S2 as action­
based predicts (i) that "System 2 thinking skills should be acquirable by imitation and 
instruction, and that sequences of System 2 reasoning should be shaped by belief about the 
ways in which one should reason" (Carruthers, 2009, 121). Plus, (ii) he expects this will 
account for variation of S2 across cultures, and (iii) explain why failures or problems with SI 
(such as in subjects with particular diseases or with brain damage) might impair S2. 
FinaHy, (iv) he also believes his account is able to resolve problems of current dual-process 
theories. 
While the first prediction is original, it is currently not confirmed, and sorne evidence 
suggests it will not lead to an adequate model of how we reason and acquire new thinking 
skills (inciuding but not limited to critical thinking; see below my discussion of Houdé 
et al. 's results). In addition, his second and third predictions are certainly not unique to his 
account. For example, Stanovich (2009, chapter 10) offers interesting explanations of cultural 
variations with his account of reasoning and of the use of mindwares (Stanovich and 
West, 2008). Moreover, any dual-process account has something to say about how a defect of 
SI might impair S2: for example, children with attention deficit disorders will have trouble 
concentrating, thus having difficulties sustaining the attention required to override certain SI 
processes. This impairment of their performance will have a direct effect on their 
competence. Certain SI processes are necessary for the execution and realization of sorne S2 
processes; in other words, there are many overlaps between processes of both systems and 
any dual-process theorist recognizes this almost trivial fact. 
Lastly, he does not argue convincingly that he IS addressing actual problems 
dual-process theorists might encounter. He rather highlights the lack of details on sorne 
important issues. For instance, Carruthers briefly argues that the relationship between SI 
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and S2 is not clear: the override mechanisms are S2 processes interacting with SI 's. Indeed, 
the interaction between both systems is rarely discussed, but many accounts, especially 
Stanovich's, can offer a convincing explanation of these relations33 . The problems Carruthers 
identifies are mostly due to the lack of research in an emerging field; they do not at the 
present appear to be unsolvable problems of dual-process theories. 
Let's return to the two problems that Carruthers's account of the SI / S2 distinction faces. 
The most acute is that it is not clear how executive control, a crucial aspect of S2 processing, 
emerges out of the automatic processes of SI, nor how executive control can 
override / intervene on SI processing. He identifies the functional and phenomenological 
differences between SI and S2, but, since he rejects any deep functional difference between 
them, he does not have the tools to explain how the iterations of SI processes can produce 
new functions such as executive control. He can, and does quite well, explain the specifie 
character of S2 processes, as they are the result of the multiple iterations of SI (hence, S2 is 
slower and seriaI), but his account lacks the capacity of explaining new capacities, viz. how 
new properties can emerge from the multiple iterations of modules. My point is that, although 
it is very likely that Carruthers' account can explain many cognitive phenomena, 1 doubt that 
it can explain al! ofthem. 
Moreover, Carruthers - in his model (Carruthers, 2006; 2009) - does not have the tools 
to explain how new brain regions become activated with a modification of the instructions 
given to solve a problem without any ad hoc hypothesis. While one could say that new brain 
areas have to be activated for the reiteration to occur, or that they become activated at a 
certain point of the iterations (see below for what this suggestion would entail), this would be 
ad hoc as it is not considered; there are no 'new' processes intervening in his account. This is 
33 As mentioned, Stanovich offers a complete and detailed account of these interactions while 
discussing the acquisition and use of mindwares (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich and West, 2008). Also, 
Stanovich never rejected that impaired parts of TASS or impaired Type 1 processes could have effects 
on S2 / Type 2 processes. Both systems are independent of each other, but S2 uses S1 inputs: for 
example, it is not possible to reason about any task if we cannot perceive it, understand it (language 
recognition), concentrate on it, remember how to proceed, and so on. 
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what Houdé and Moutier's (1996; 1999) work in neuroscience illustrates. It suggests that the 
brain areas that are activated before and after the subjects receive a training in 10gic to solve 
Wason selection task-type problems are the same, and they rarely give the right answer. 
However, in a more recent study (Houdé et al., 2000), Houdé and his colleagues showed that 
subjects trained to inhibit their perceptual bias (cf. Evans, 1998; 2003), viz. made aware of 
their cognitive conflict, were better at solving a selection task and the brain areas activated 
were not the same anymore (the neural activation patterns shifted from the occipital lobe to 
the frontal lobe). As the authors explain: 
The most striking result obtained here is the change in the cortical anatomy of reasoning, 
which shifted from the posterior part of the brain on the pretest to a left-prefrontal 
network on the posttest, thereby reflecting the change in the subjects' reasoning 
strategies. (Houdé et a!., 2000, 723) 
How can Carruthers explain this shift if the subjects are only iterating SI processes? It seems 
hard to explain the inhibition of the subjects' initial answer while only learning and repeating 
the task does not work (Houdé and Moutier, 1996; 1999). Here is how he could perhaps 
explain it: the erroneous S2 responses result from the activation of SI processes A, Band C, 
which each corresponds to a specific brain activation pattern. In Houdé and 
Moutier's (1996; 1999) studies, the subject learns to explicitly use the process D involving an 
explicit rule, viz. linked to language, but the processing made by A, B, C and D does not 
change the subject's answer because the processes that caused the errors in the first place are 
still executed. And since process D is of the same type as A, B, and C, the same general brain 
regions are activated. When the subject is then made aware of his perceptual bias, he learns 
something that makes him use process E, through an explicit instruction of sorne sort, and 
then succeeds at the task (Houdé et al., 2000) either because E has the effect of inhibiting C, 
or because E is such as it overrides C. Hence, the processing of A, Band E allows the 
production of the correct answer. And since E involves the inhibition of activity that is 
located in a new part of the brain, this part lights up on the scan34 . 
34 One frequent critique of current imaging techniques is that they calUlOt distinguish between 
activation-in-the-course-of-processing and activation-in-the-course-of-inhibiting-processes. 
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This explanation fits Carruthers' framework perfectly as action-rehearsal through inner 
speech could very weil account for this change as it would activate a new process or inhibit 
the one producing the error (as described in the last paragraph), potentially showing 
differences in the neural activation patterns - imagining an image will activate visual areas, 
while activating the memory of smells or sounds will activate brain areas corresponding to 
that sense. 
But this calls attention to the previous difficulty arising from Carruthers' account, as it 
does not give an explanation of what determines the controlled execution of inner speech 
driven action-rehearsal in one way rather than the other, viz. why one set of instruction will 
be preferred, in a given context, to the other one. In Lieberman's framework, this is where 
self-control would be involved. In the situation described by Houdé et al., conflict detection 
and the capacity to override when needed are partially explained by Carruthers' framework 
but the crucial aspect of executive control is not. In fact, what happens in Houdé et al.'s 
experiment is easy to account for since the instruction that is needed to solve successfully the 
problem is given by the experimenter, or is made prominent by the experimental set-up. The 
experimenter acts just like the executive control wouId, by specifying the correct set of 
instruction to use in a given situation. But what about a situation where two or more sets of 
instruction are available to the subject: how is the choice made, and why? The controlled 
aspect ofthese processes eludes Carruthers' model: how is the correct or incorrect instruction 
activated, and then chosen? How does the instruction gets involved in this particular iteration, 
why is it remembered and what is our control on when and why it is activated? It is however 
important to be careful in answering these questions: as Stanovich (2004, 44-47) remarked, it 
is essential to avoid the homunculus problem. 
Results similar to Houdé and colleagues' (2000) are weil accounted for in Lieberman's 
framework (Lieberman, 2007; Satpute and Lieberman, 2006), and it might help us understand 
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what exactly goes on in the brain in suchsituations35 • There needs to be sorne sort of 
executive control intervening. Specifie neural activation patterns related to self-control have 
been identified: it is the alleged function of the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Cohen 
and Lieberman, 2010). More generally, this difference is correlated with different neural 
activation patterns depending on the task at hand, sometimes associated with Type 1 
processing, and sometimes with Type 2 (Goel, 2007). 
2.3 Lieberman on neurological and deep functïonal differences 
Lieberman 's (2007; 2009; Satpute and Lieberman, 2006) position is in opposition to 
Carruthers' as he argues that there are important differences, deep functional difJerences as 1 
would put it, between what he calls the ref1exive system (X-system, or SI) and the ref1ective 
system (C-system, or S2). Not only are the cognitive processes he singles out associated with 
different areas of the brain, but he associates both of them with different characteristics, from 
the phenomenological to the representational and evolutionary (cf. Table 2.3). 
1 will not go into the details of each of the characteristics enumerated in Table 2.3, as 
they are pretty much self explanatory, but it is interesting to see how Lieberman's account 
overlaps with duaI-process theories in general, that he also adds sorne important 
characteristics, mostly coming from his field of inquiry, social cognitive neurosciences. His 
view introduces c1ear distinctions, as each system is associated with precise characteristics. 
Lieberman has the tools to make, with his account of dual-process theories, many 
35 Stanovich's framework (Stanovich and West, 2008) can account for this shi ft in neuronal 
activation too. In fact, Stanovich's account is really close to Lieberman's, as he agrees there are 
domain general processes that can account for much of higher cognition. 
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predictions36 - for example, he can infer, from the activation of a glven brain region 
(cf. Figure 2.1), the phenomenological and representational characteristics, and the converse 
is also true. 
Figure 2.1 Hypothesized neural cOITelates of the C-system supporting reflective social 
cognition (analogous to controlled processing) and the X-system supporting reflexive social 
cognition (analogous to automatic processing) displayed on a canonical brain rendering from (A) 
lateral, (B) ventral, and (C) medial views. (From Lieberman, 2007, 262.) 
36 Lieberman (2009) suggests this difference in how is the brain activated when reflective and 
non-reflective processes are involved gives strong evidence against the psychological zombie 
hypotheses, but this is not important in the CUITent discussion. l am mostly interested in how he 
characterizes each system in order to develop his argument. 
Psychological zombie hypotheses differ from Kirk's (1974) zombie hypothesis: a psychological 
zombie hypothesis "suggests that our behaviors and judgments are produced by an 'inner-zombie' 
whose mental work does not depend on conscious awareness and that those mental operations that are 
typically accompanied by conscious awareness do not rely on awareness to generate the operations and 
their outputs" (Lieberman, 2009, 293). This kind of hypothesis suggests that awareness is superfluous. 
Thought experiments around blindsight tend to go in this general direction (Holt, 1999), but Lieberman 
argues, successfully l think, that this line of argument is faulty. 
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Table 2.3
 
Characteristics of the X-system and C-system. (From Lieberman, 2009,294)
 
Phenomenological 
characteristics 
Processing characteristics 
Representational 
characteristics 
Evolutionary characteristics 
Moderator efJects 
Brain regions 
X-system 
Non-reflective consciousness 
Feels spontaneous or intuitive 
Outputs experienced as reality 
Parallel processing 
Fast operating 
Slow learning 
Implicit learning of associations 
Pattern matching and pattern 
completion 
Typically sensory 
Representation of symmetric 
relations 
Representation of common cases 
Representations are not tagged for 
time, place, ownership, identity 
Phylogenetically oider 
Similar across species 
Sensitive to subliminal 
presentations 
Relation to behavior unaffected 
by cognitive load 
Facilitated by high arousal 
Amygdala, ventral striatum, 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, 
lateral temporal cortex 
C-system 
Reflective consciousness 
Feels intentional and deliberative 
Outputs experienced as self­
generated 
Seriai processing 
Slow operating 
Fast learning 
Explicit rules of learning 
Symbolic logic and propositional 
Typically linguistic 
Representation of asymmetric and 
conditional relations 
Representation of special cases 
(e.g. exceptions) 
Representation of abstract 
features that distinguish (e.g. 
negation, time, ownership, 
identity) 
Phylogenetically newer 
Different in primates or humans 
Insensitive to subliminal 
presentations 
Relation to behavior altered by 
cognitive load 
Impaired by high arousal 
Lateral prefrontal cortex, medial 
prefrontal cortex, lateral 
prefrontal cortex, medial posterior 
parietal cortex, rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex, medial temporal 
lobe 
The two systems usually are in harmony in Lieberman's Vlew, even if they are 
sometimes competing one with the other - especial1y in experimental settings. More 
importantly however, they are separable, something impossible on Carruthers' view as he 
believes S2 is realized in multiple iterations of S 1 processes. 
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In most of the literature, the systems even seem to be always in competition with one 
another. It is important to note that in the experimental tasks, the goal is to differentiate the 
two systems, to identify their distinguishing features. This is why X and C systems appear as 
independent. But, out of the lab, "in everyday life, most tasks probably rely on both systems 
simultaneously" (Lieberman, 2009, 313) and X and C systems are such that they work 
together to produce reliable outputs. In Lieberman 's view however, this collaboration 
between systems remains this: two distinct systems, systems we can identify at various levels 
including the neurological, collaborating. 
Lieberman goes as far as to say that the systems are operating "upon different 
principles" (2009, 313) and he relies on various neuroimaging studies to illustrate and justify 
his claim that different neurological mechanisms are at work. The study by Houdé 
et al. (2000) discussed above shows a similar phenomenon happening when subjects change 
their reasoning strategies in a particular reasoning task. In Figure 2.1, from 
Lieberman (2007, 262), the brain regions associated with each system are illustrated. 
There are, as Lieberman emphasizes, specifie neural activation patterns depending on 
whether the tasks involve controlled processes or not (cf. Goel, 2007). He argues this 
difference suggests there is a "core-processing distinction" (Lieberman, 2007, 276), where 
there is a strong link between the neural activation patterns and the phenomenon observed. 
According to Evans, "this research program provides perhaps the strongest basis in the 
literature for maintaining sorne form of dual-system distinction" (2008, 270, my emphasis). 
However if, as 1 argued in section 0.2, the mind is a kluge, it would be very surprising to 
discover that it has indeed two perfectly distinct systems, collaborating to "achieve the best 
outcomes" (Lieberman, 2009, 313). Just as the outcomes of evolutionary processes are 
usually inelegant, we can, l believe, suppose the same is true with the human mind and, as il 
is the result of an evolutionary process, Lieberman's 'panglossian' account is not very 
plausible: we cannot divide the mind so neatly. 
As we will see in the next section, the characteristics attributed to both systems by most 
dual-process theorists, and Lieberman is particularly vulnerable to this critique, are indeed 
tao rigid ta identify ail the complex and rich processing the brain is capable of. While 
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Lieberman's evidence is compelling (he even identifies convincingly sorne domain general 
processes that seem distinct from the X-system processing; cf. Cohen and Lieberman, 2010), 
his account is probably not subtle enough to characterize correctly sorne of the cognitive 
processes at play. He does identify very important and interesting characteristics of sorne 
processes, but his framework has to be, at least, weakened in sorne respects. 
2.4 Unsystematic systems 
As 1 will now argue, the most important problem that accounts of dual-process theories 
relying on the characterization of systems face is that the lists of characteristics attributed to 
each system are too rigid. Evans, even if he agrees that Lieberman's evidence is compelling, 
mentions that a "close inspection of the evidence suggests that generic dual-system theory is 
currently oversimplified and misleading" (Evans, 2008, 270). He makes this point because it 
is not possible to link in a coherent way ail the characteristics enumerated in Table 2.2 (or 
those in Table 2.3), but also because sorne accounts of dual-process theories are not fully 
compatible with each other (Evans, 2009) - which partly explains why it is difficult to 
construct a generic account, as we examined in 2.1. Those differences make it impossible to 
map ail the processes of dual-process theories in a generic framework such as those currently 
advocated. 
White building genenc dual-process theory accounts, to explain these differences 
between dual-process accounts, but also to suggest a theory where the relevant data is 
accounted for, sorne authors have begun to suggest amendments to one of the original 
frameworks. While sorne are suggesting we should distinguish between up to four types of 
processing in a multiple-systems framework (Moshman, 2000), or even more complex 
architectures, others are arguing against each of the proposed criteria to distinguish the 
systems, using examples and counter-examples to show the account in question is too limited 
or has an important problem when trying to expJain sorne of the data, sometimes ultimately 
rejecting dual-process theories altogether (e.g. Osman, 2004). One of the important and 
influential change introduced in the recent literature is Samuels' (2009) proposaI oftalking of 
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'Types' of processes instead of 'Systems' (I will return to this argument at the beginning of 
Chapter III), such as it is usually the case with the SI / S2 distinction. It allows more 
flexibility to the accounts of dual-process theories proposed, but there are still sorne problems 
to face. 
Of course, sorne of the dual-process accounts, such as Fodor's (1983), are obviously 
problematic as they offer very limited account of how the mind works; Fodor's modularity 
only identify a small subset of cognitive processes, peripheral cognition and the input 
modules, and central cognition, only identified with a vague definition. As l argued in lA, an 
account resembling Samuels' (2006) characterization of weak central modularity hypothesis 
is surely more plausible and has more potential to yield fruitful research programs. However, 
even moderate accounts encounter difficulties, sorne that might be insurmountable. Here are 
two examples: Stanovich's (2004; 2009) and Evans' (2009) accounts. 
2.4.1 Stanovich's three rninds 
In 2.1, l suggested that Stanovich's (2004) framework has sorne problems, bringing him 
adopt a modified account of his original position in his 2009 book. As a reminder, Stanovich 
replaced the distinction between systems SI and S2 with a distinction between Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes, these types of processes being divided among three systems, the 
autonomous, the algorithrnic and the reflective minds. 
Stanovich describes S2 as "more strongly associated with individual differences in 
cognitive in computational capacity (indirectly indicated by tests of intelligence and cognitive 
abilities - and more indirectly tapped by indicators of working memory)" (2004, 36). 
However, Stanovich and West (2008) encountered sorne experimental results incompatible 
with this framework: they show that for sorne tasks involving cognitive control, performance 
is nol correlated al ail (or very poorly) with cognitive ability (as measured by IQ tests). For 
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example, the myside biases37 (Stanovich and West, 2007) or the anchoring effects38 do not 
correlate with cognitive ability, while belief biases sometimes do (Stanovich and West, 2008, 
experiment 8). In other words, success in sorne cognitive tasks is correlated with cognitive 
ability (IQ), while it is not correlated with cognitive abilities in other tasks, something hard to 
account for with a 'single, unified, S2' as Stanovich's (2004) S2. 
Separating the processes between two types, distributed among three minds, allows him 
to explain this problem in a convincing framework. The new framework also provides useful 
tools and an interesting explanation to what is going on in the study by Houdé et al. (2000). 
Moreover, the introduction of the distinction between the algorithmic and the reflective 
minds, where there was only a reflective mind before, allows Stanovich (2009) to understand 
better these differences in the correlations between success and cognitive ability, but the 
processes involved are more or less similar to the processes he described as comprising S2 in 
his 2004 account; they only are distributed differently. Still, there are processes hard to 
classify by Stanovich's most recent account, such as preattentive processes, since he is 
mostly interested in reasoning and reasoning strategies and not, for example, in the 
'consciousness' axis of the distinction between S 1 and S2. 
37 'Myside biases,' also called confirmation biases, refer to "the tendency to evaluate propositions 
from within one's own perspective when given no instructions or cues (such as within-participants 
conditions) to avoid doing so" (Stanovich and West, 2007, abstract). Interestingly, Mercier and 
Sperber (forthcoming) argue this is a feature of reasoning because it is usefuJ in the construction of 
arguments. 
38 The 'anchoring effects' are a set of cognitive bias observed when people make an estimate from 
an initial value that they must adjust: people adjust the value to a certain extent but the adjustment is 
insufflcient. The result is that "different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased 
toward the initial values" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1128). In other words, when asking people to 
estimate a value they do not know, if we give them a small number, they will tend to make a smaller 
estimate than if we give them a bigger number. 
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2.4.2 Evans' Type 3 processes 
Evans (200939), encountering a different problem than Stanovich's, suggests we should 
adopt, just as Stanovich, Type 1 and Type 2 processes, but that we should moreover add 
Type 3 processes to explain sorne characteristics of the mind that are impossible to account 
for with only Type 1 and 2. Type 3 processes refer to the processes allowing "resource 
allocation, conflict resolution, and ultimate control ofbehavior" (Evans, 2009, 48). Indeed: in 
an account where the distinction between the two systems, or two types of processes, is rigid 
and where SI processes are fast, impl icit and demand low effort and where S2 processes are 
controlled and conscious, it is difficult to explain how to classifY pre-attentive processes, 
such as the control of attention and the detection of cognitive conflido. Type 3 processes 
administer the interactions between Type 1 and 2 processes. In the end, these Type 3 
processes are somewhat similar to Baars' account of attention control in his general 
workspace as advocated by Carruthers (2006; 2009). 
Evans' motivations are linked to "recent evidence [suggesting] that the mind does detect 
conflict, even when we are not conscious that it is doing so" (Evans, 2009, 49). The example 
given by Evans is that of a driver having a conversation while 'unconsciously' driving: if a 
hazardous situation presents itself - a car suddenly braking, a moose coming out of the 
39 It might seem strange that Evans (2009) advocates the view 1 will describe below afler the 
publication of his Annual Review of Psychology article, where he suggests we use the distinction 
Type 1 / Type 2, but the article published in 2009 is part of the proceedings of a 2006 conference. For 
the same reason, Evans (2008) mentions Samuels' (2009) argument, before the publication of the 
article (he quotes the conference presentation in the paper). 
40 Usually, in dual-process theories, the allocation of resource and the resolution of conflict are 
attributed to S2 (cf. Cohen and Lieberman, 2010) since its role is to monitor SI activity and decide 
whether to intervene (Evans, 2009, 48), but it is an unconscious process - something incompatible 
with S2 or Type 2 processes' characterization. But we cannot characterize these pre-attentive processes 
as Type 1 since the role of these processes is to override defau It processes - a characteristic attributed 
to S2 or Type 2 processes. Evans (2007) salves this problem by introducing a third parameter 
describing "the probability that a type 2 rather than type 1 process will take control [of the behavior]" 
(Evans, 2009, 47), which he explains by using Type 3 processes in his 2009 article (for more details, 
cf. Evans, 2009, 46-50). 
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woods, etc. - attention automatically shifts. This is, according to Evans, the doing of Type 3 
processes (or System 3). Such a process is neither Type 1 nor Type 2, as it has characteristics 
from both types of processes: compared to a rigid '(only) two types of processes' framework, 
Evans' alternative might be a reasonable one. 
While the introduction of a new type of process is problematic, at least to a certain 
degree, for Lieberman's accouot, the idea 1 want to emphasize here is the difficulty of any 
account that has two clusters of cognitive processes (whatever you cali them) identified each 
with a precise set of characteristics. Such accounts inevitably face difficulties when they try 
to explain processes that are not easily identifiable with these two systems, thus SI and S2 
because of their rigidity are ill-conceived. As it is, there always will be a process or a set of 
processes that is hard to understand in any two-track model - emotions might just be in this 
category (Darlow and Sioman, 2010; de Sousa, 2010). 1 believe that my account, inspired 
from Samuels' (2009) critique of dual-process theories, has the potential of offering a more 
comprehensive account, a framework that 1will develop in Chapter III. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, 1 discussed various accounts of dual-process theories and argued that the 
CUITent accounts are on shaky grounds. 1 showed that sorne of the representative theories 
cUITently available encounter problems when explaining sorne phenomena. The 'Systems' or 
the 'Types' are infeITed from a very small set of data, for example the set of data coming 
from the psychology of reasoning (dual-process theories of reasoning originate from the 
analysis made by Wason and Evans' in their 1975 article), and then the principles found are 
applied to larger sets of data. Facing complex sets of data and nonstandard processes, these 
theories must be adapted - sometimes by adding a new set of processes along the way - and 
these epicycles 'complexify' the theory. As illustrated in 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, many of these 
'epicycles' - not always compatible between them - are added to make sense of the data in a 
given dual-process framework, and they are, in this sense, ad hoc. 
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Stanovich's and Evans' theories encounter difficulties that are representative of those 
found in this literature: the proposed description of each system, or of each type of processes, 
gives rise to two restrictive categories in which sorne cognitive processes are hard - and 
sometimes impossible! - to map. Lieberman's account is the clearest example: his framework 
is very interesting and would allow for much explanatory power, but his distinction between 
the C-system and the X-system can only explain a limited number of cognitive processes - it 
is not a theory able to explain ail cognitive processes. 
As for Carruthers atypical account, it helps resolving sorne problems - and it is quite 
plausible that many Type 2 processes may in fact the result from (only, or almost only) 
iterations of Type 1 processes. 1 think however the burden of proof is in Carruthers' hands: he 
would have to show that everything we want to account for can be explained in his 
framework, especially executive control. These problems are not alien to those he encounters 
by using his too weak account of 'module.' Because he wants to expJain everything cognitive 
with a single notion, Carruthers' very ambitious program quickly becomes unviable. 
ln my last chapter, l want to suggest an account of dual-process theories that solves 
many of the problems identified in the first two chapters of this dissertation, but first 1 will 
examine Samuels (2009) suggestion of replacing the division of the mind in two 'Systems' 
by a distinction between 'Types of processes,' viz. he suggests the idea that there is no 
plausible way to argue there are a single SI and a single S2. 
CHAPTERIII 
CONCEPTUAL SPACE AND THE TYPE 1 / TYPE 2 DISTINCTION AS A 
HEURISTIC: ANOTHER ACCOlJ]\[T OF DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES 
As 1 hinted at when 1 discussed Stanovich's (2009) and Evans' (2009) recent accounts, a 
CUITent trend in dual-process theories is to abandon the division into 'Systems,' in order to 
prefer the distinction between 'Types of processes.' This is an interesting and important 
development as it gives better tools to consider the large variety of cognitive processes. Still, 
the 'Types' accounts as they are cUITently discussed in the literature are not exempt of 
problems, as 1 suggested in 2.4. 
A first problem for dual-process theories reconceived as a distinction between 'Types of 
processes' is that abandoning the 'Systems' accounts makes dual-process theories lose sorne 
of their explanatory power: an account such as Lieberman's (2007; 2009) is really useful 
when we try to understand how the mind might work; as Samuels writes: "Dual-process 
theorizing is' worthy of serious consideration because it earns its exp/ana/ory 
keep." (2009,138) Yet, it is clear that ifthere were no identifiable 'System' whatsoever, then 
it wouId be preferable to abandon this account for a more adequate one, and 1 argued that, 
even if Lieberman's account is interesting to account for important aspects of cognition, it is 
too rigid to explain al! of it. Moreover, as 1 will show in section 3.3.3, it is possible to get 
similar explanatory power with another conception of dual-process theories. The second 
problem is that, with the rigidity of the 'Types' proposed in current accounts (Evans, 2009; 
Samuels, 2009; Stanovich, 2009), we encounter similar problems as those with the 'Systems' 
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account. Evans' (2009) introduction of Type 3 processes is a clear example of this kind of 
difficu lty. 
There are two central goals in this chapter: first, to show that dual-process theories as 
currently conceived are untenable - whether we characterize this 'dual' distinction as 
between 'Systems' or 'Types of processes,' and, second, to lay the foundations of a new 
framework. In this new framework, much of the explanatory power of CUITent dual-process 
theories is preserved, the labels 'Type l'and 'Type 2' acquire a new meaning, and does so 
without cutting corners or oversimplifying the complexity of the many cognitive processes 
under scrutiny. 
1 will begin with a presentation of Samuels' (2009) account of dual-process theories, 
where he argues that the mind has two 'Types of processes.' 1 will mostly center my analysis 
on the problems he identifies with the traditional dual-process theories (i.e. the theories 
dividing the mind into two 'Systems'). 1 will then show there are sorne problems with his 
own account, impossible to solve in his framework; in a nutshell, his 'Types' are still too 
narrowly defined to explain al! of cognition. 
At the end on.l, 1 will show that using the idea ofa continuum to analyze these 'Types 
of processes' might help resolve sorne of Samuels' difficulties. In 3.2, however, 1 will 
suggest that even this idea of a continuum (cf. Hammond, 1996) has problems and 1 will 
argue for a framework that has the potential of solving much, if not al l, of the problems of 
current dual-process theories. 
Briefly, 1 will argue that by considering the distinction between 'Types of processes' in 
terms of continua rather than in terms of an either-or distinction, we will be able to make a 
first step, resolving sorne of Evans' (2009) concerns. However, a single continuum will not 
be enough to preserve each process' distinctive characteristics: many continua forming a 
n-dimensional conceptual space (where n is the number of characteristics considered) should 
provide us with a more adequate framework. After arguing for this framework in 3.2, 1 will 
finally discuss three of its advantages in 3.3. 
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3.1 From 'Systems' to 'Types': going beyond 
The idea of abandoning the 'Systems' accounts to adopt a division between types of 
processes cornes from Samuels (2009). What Samuels suggests is that we should no longer 
talk of 'System l'and 'System 2' in order to talk in terms of 'Types of processes.' The 
'Systems' accounts refer to two tokens (SI and S2), while, in the 'Types' account he 
proposes, these labels identify types instead of tokens, viz. "it seems 1ikely that there are both 
many system Is and many systems 2s." (Samuels, 2009, 138). He argues that, on the one 
hand, many dual-process theorists agree that SI is a set of Type 1 processes (e.g. 
Stanovich's TASS) and that, on the other, there is no solid evidence that S2 is unified in any 
way (e.g. Stanovich's algorithmic and reflective minds; cf. Samuels, 2009, 137, 
Consideration 2). Different S2 accounts attribute different properties to S2: Samuels 
identifies functional differences (planning is different from deductive inference41 ) and there 
are also differences in computational demand for various (S2) processes. Samuels' point is 
"that the most plausible view of this sort is one that reconstructs the original SI / S2 
distinction [what he calls the 'Token Thesis'] as a distinction between kinds or types of 
psychological systems" (Samuels, 2009, 145), viz. what he dubs the 'Type Thesis.' 
While he suggests we talk in terms of 'Types of processes' rather than in terms of 
'Systems,' Samuels remains vague about how we should identify these types of processes 
and about what these types identify. With the 'Type Thesis' however, Samuels still maintains 
that characteristics from Table 2.1 co-vary, but he is no longer committed to the 'Token 
Thesis' where there are a single SI and a single S2. 
41 ''[. .. ) planning is centrally concerned with the guidance of action - with identifying sequences 
of behaviors that collectively facilitate the attairunent of our goals. Moreover (and presumably because 
of this) planning involves a quite different mapping from inputs to outputs than those found in 
deductive inference or causal reasoning. Most obviously, a planning process takes both beliefs and 
goals (or desires) as input and generates plans (or intentions) as output, whereas other sorts of process 
- deductive inference or causal explanation, for example - do not." (Samuels, 2009, 137) 
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ln a way, a problem with the 'Type Thesis' is the same as the one researchers encounter 
with the 'Systems' accounts: the processes examined are rich, complex and hard to c1assify in 
fixed categories. This problem is less troublesome with the 'Types' accounts, where it is 
possible to attribute sorne characteristics to a process, but not others, but difficulties are not 
entirely eliminated. Samuels identifies three challenges for the 'Types' account, challenges 
that illustrate very weil sorne, but not ail, of the difficulties 1 am referring to: the specification 
problem, the crossover problem and the unity problern. What 1 claim is that the crossover 
problem cannot be resolved in a satisfying way with Sarnuels' thesis. 
The specification problem might be the most complicated of the three, and the one 
necessitating the most research: how should we specify each type of process? Which 
characteristics should be retained? Characteristic clusters attributed to S1 and S2 are often 
criticized because, in the 'Systems' framework, it is easy to find a process that is at odds with 
the other processes of a given system (or with the systems themselves). (Re)Conceiving 
dual-process theories as identifying two types of processes instead of two systems (tokens) 
will partIy resolve this difficulty, and it allows researchers to revise the characteristics 
attributed to each process. Even then, it is still not easy to identify which characteristics are 
the most important ones. 
Samuels believes the specification problem will be resolved when the current hypotheses 
regarding the attribution of characteristics to processes is more refined; only more empirical 
research can help achieve this. While doing so, it is necessary not ta specify each type too 
narrowly, as we would encounter problems such as the ones 1 highlighted in 2.4, especially 
when 1 exposed sorne ofthe problems with Evans' (2009) position. 
Samuels' 'Types' account hints at a possible solution to the second problem, the 
crossover problern. The crossover problem might be the rnost important problem of 
Lieberman's (2007; 2009) account and, one could argue it is also a problem of ail generic 
dual-process theories: Samuels explains the crossover as the possibility of a process to have 
characteristics from both columns of Table 2.2, since "the characteristics exhibited by 
cognitive processes are not arnenable to a c1ean bipartite division into two property clusters" 
(Samuels, 2009, 140). There are sorne processes hard to categorize in either S1 or S2 as they 
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exhibit properties from both. The crossover problem appears in the description of many 
processes, but Samuels suggests it might be caused by sorne characteristics that should not 
have been used to distinguish the two types of processes, such as evolutionary recency, rather 
than by many processes exhibiting characteristics proper to different types. He gives, as an 
example, judgments of numerical magnitudes, which exhibit SI and S2 properties at the same 
time: it is evolutionarily recent like a (Type 2) characteristic, since the number Stroop effect42 
is possible only with known numerals - Arabic or otherwise (which are learned through 
Type 2 processes) -, but it is nevertheless fast, automatic and demands low effort (ail Type 1 
characteristics). In the end, counterexamples such as this one, these 'hard to characterize' 
processes impose, Samuels believes, "modest revisions" that provide "no serious grounds for 
rejecting the Type Thesis as such," as long as these revisions are not "too numerous or too 
extreme" (Samuels, 2009, 140-141). In other words, there is no real crossover problem for 
Samuels: only characteristics that should not be incorporated in the characterization of either 
Type 1 or Type 2 processes (plus the possibility of sorne rare exceptions). 
The crossover problem is much more serious, 1 believe, than Samuels claims. Not only 
are there processes exhibiting characteristics from each cluster of properties, but there are 
processes exhibiting S2 / Type 2 characteristics at first but that, with practice, repetition, etc., 
acquire SI/Type 1 characteristics. While the 'Types' account allows us to characterize such 
changes, it does not explain how the transition is possible, or how one process can change in 
any way (or, worse, how a process can change according to one characteristic, but not the 
other). In a similar fashion, Stanovich (2004, 38 & 42) acknowledges the possibility that a 
process may change type, but does not provide a framework in which we can specify and 
understand what exactly is changing, and what is going on at the phenomenological, the 
42 The most known example of an experiment demonstrating the Stroop effect is when the 
experimenter asks the subjects to name the color in which a word is written and that the word 
presented is the name of another color (e.g. the word 'blue' written in green). These experiments 
suggest that reading abilities are as automatic as perceiving the color, because the word (automatically) 
read by the subjects interferes importantly with their reaction time when they have to name the co[ors 
they see. This 'interference' is what is meant by 'Stroop effect.' 
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representational or the neurological leve1. 1 will explore how to think about what 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) calls 'modularization' in 3.3.2. 
The third problem Samuels discusses is the unity problem. What are the unifying 
characteristics of Type 1 and Type 2 processes (if any)? Sioman's (1996) suggestion is to 
distinguish between rule-based and association-based processes, which would correspond 
roughly to the distinction between classic computationalism and connectionism; 
Carruthers' (2006; 2009) proposai is to understand S2 / Type 2 processes as being realized in 
cycles of SI/Type 1 processes (as 1 examined, and rejected, in 2.2) and, finally, 
Evans (2008; 2009) argues the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 is linked with how 
working memory functions. 
While this suggestion by Evans might be the most interesting one (Samuels, 2009, 144), 
1 think it would be very surprising for the Type 1 / Type 2 distinction to be one-dimensional, 
even if sorne of the dimensions might be more characteristic of one type than the other 
(cf. 3.2.1). In the following sections, 1 will detail my own account of dual-process theories: 1 
think that, while the 'Types' account is interesting, it needs sorne rethinking. 
3.2 Continua, conceptual space, frontiers and sorne grey areas 
What we saw thus far might give the impression, and has given many the impression 
(e.g. Machery, 2009), that it is futile to try to sort cognitive processes in one oftwo (or three, 
four) precisely defined classes. Dual-process theories look like a wild goose chase: it seems 
as if there is no clear difference between SI and S2, or even a c1ear distinction to make 
between two types of processes. Machery's (2009, chapter 5; forthcoming) critique of 
Stanovich (1999; Stanovich and West, 2000) could be made to many dual-process theories, 
even more recent ones: 
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Like many dual-process theories, Stanovich's dual-process theory is somewhat 
unsatisfying. The cognitive processes that are assumed to constitute System 1 and 
System 2 are not described in any detail. Their triggering conditions and the nature of the 
integrative or non-integrative mechanisms are left pretty much unspecified. As a result, it 
is difficult to derive any clear predictions from his theory, which is better suited to 
provide post-hoc explanations. Thus, in spite of the real interest ofStanovich's work, his 
dual-process theory illustrates the pitfalls to be avoided in building a multi-process 
theory. (Machery, 2009,147-148) 
l believe this impression is correct (see also Keren and Schul, 2009), but only to a certain 
extent. Behind many accounts of dual-process theories, there is the assumption that we will 
find two neatly distinguishable systems, groups of processes or kinds of processes able ta 
explain ail ofcognition. This is true of ail of the authors discussed so far in this dissertation. 
The 'Systems' view is weil illustrated by Lieberman (2007; 2009), and Stanovich (2009) and 
Evans (2009) are adopting a 'Types' view. These views are, according to what l have been 
arguing, unable to account for sorne phenomena, and they should be abandoned in favor of a 
· h .more cornpre enslve account43 
However, Carruthers' (2006; 2009) account - eliminating any deep functional difference 
between the systems or processes - is not a very plausible alternative. While his account is 
interesting, he too has problematic assumptions, such as that the characteristics attributed 
43 This does not mean in any way that their data is useless and that they did not make any useful 
empirical hypotheses. l believe their work only has to be reexamined under a new light and that the 
perspective developed in the following sections might help to understand sorne of the difficulties they 
encounter. 
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to S2 would be uniquely human44 , as weil as the very fact that he does not recognize there are 
deep functional differences between cognitive processes (cf. 2.2). AIso, his account is not 
precise enough - as we saw in 1.3, his definition of the notion of 'module' is open to 
criticism - and his theoretical framework has limited power to account for sorne of the cases 
studied in the literature. Again: the solution is not to abandon completely the current dual­
process frameworks, as even Carruthers' brings forward an important and interesting idea ­
the role of iterated Type 1 processes and a plausible account of (sorne of) consciousness - by 
reinterpreting Baars' (1988; 1997) general workspace theory in the dual-process framework. 
Ali of the theories mentioned above only need to be placed in a wider framework where 
we can understand that they only explain parts of cognition, and this has been the driving 
force behind most of the arguments presented in this dissertation against diverse dual-process 
accounts. Samuels' (2009) proposaI was seen as the most plausible up to now, but it also has 
44 ln a framework where, as 1 will argue, we can consider independently each characteristic 
attributed to S2 / Type 2 processes, there is no reason to think Type 2 processes are uniquely human, or 
that they are necessarily linked to language. Of course, language plays a very important role in human 
cognition (and it certainly enhances a lot of our abilities), but it does not mean that ail of the abilities 
we have that are linked to language need language to exist. For example, language can help and 
enhance our capacity to learn, but it does not mean that, without language, there would be no learning. 
Taking S2 / Type 2 processes to be uniquely human is an assumption made by many models and 
it certainly is wrong. As Evans explains: "Taken in conjunction with the evidence of higher-order 
control systems in animais (Toates 2006), these arguments [about the possible existence of explicit 
memory systems in animais] suggest that dual-system theorists would be better off c1aiming that 
System 2 cognition is uniquely developed, rather than uniquely present, in modern humans. Such an 
argument also has much greater evolutionary plausibility." (Evans, 2008, 260) 
This distinction between 'uniquely human' and 'uniquely developed in humans' might have very 
important consequences on how we link dual-process theorizing with reflections on the evolution of 
language. Many Type 2 processes are indeed strongly linked to capacities necessary for developing 
language, and being able to distinguish each of these capacities might prove to be crucial: we can think 
of Type 2 processes that are nonlinguistic. As Fitch mentions, after his discussion of animal cognition: 
"[ ... ] a large body of experimental work demonstrates considerable cognitive abilities in nonhuman 
animais. Many different vertebrates have a surprisingly rich conceptual world and a broadly shared 
cognitive "toolkit" (Hauser, 2000), and the data reviewed above leave little doubt that sophisticated 
cognition is possible in the absence of language. Many capabilities that were long thought to be unique 
to humans have now been demonstrated convincingly in animais. These include cross-modal 
association, episodic memory, anticipatory cognition, gaze following, basic theory of mind, tool use, 
and tool construction." (Fitch, 2010, 171-172) 
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important problems, as the types of processes, if defined with the same characteristics (even 
if we use just a few of them) as those attributed to each system in Table 2.2, will exclude 
many actual cognitive processes (e.g. those Evans calls Type 3). Samuels claims this problem 
is not serious since he doubts that a few exceptions will prove to be fatal for the 'Types' 
account of dual-process theories4S • His view would be plausible if there were only a few 
exceptions. 
As it turns out, most processes actually are exceptions in the sense that most cognitive 
processes do not neatly comply with the lists presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for at least one 
characteristic. 'Searching' for an answer in our memory surely has a controlled and conscious 
element to it, but most of it is resolved automatically and unconsciousl/6 (to use Baars' 
expression: "That Little Pause before the Answer Cornes to Mind"; Baars, 1997, 49). 
Reasoning is also mostly controlled, although the heuristics discussed previously play an 
important role. Even seemingly completely automatic processes, reflexes for example, 
usually have a few 'Type 2' characteristics or, at least, can acquire them. As Machery 
recently puts it: 
l suspect that the slow / fast, conscious / unconscious, linguistic / nonlinguistic, recent / 
ancient, non-heuristic / heuristic, rule-based / similarity-driven, etc. dichotomies are by 
no rneans aligned. That is, 1 argue that these dichotomies are orthogonal from one 
another: sorne processes are slow and nonlinguistic, sorne processes are heuristic, 
linguistic and conscious, sorne processes are ancient and non-heuristic, and so on. [... ] 
Sorne non-automatic processes are ancient and nonlinguistic (Evans, 2008), sorne 
automatic processes are not heuristic (e.g. Woodward and Allman, 2008), sorne 
automatic processes (such as the abilities of experts) are acquired by learning [e.g. 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986], and so on. (Machery, forthcoming, my translation) 
45 "[ ... ] should the existence of crossovers lead us to reject dual-process theory? The answer is, 1 
maintain, that it poses no serious problem, so long as crossovers are not too numerous or too extreme." 
(Samuels, 2009, 140, my emphasis) 
46 This is a very good example of multiple iterations of SI processes that can become conscious, 
as Carruthers suggests. 
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Could it only depend on how we individuate the processes? This might be, of course, 
part of the answer, but, in general, these 'Types' have more the feel of an archetypal 
description of 'ideal' processes than one of an accurate description of actual processes. It 
seems the characteristics were attributed to each process of a given type a priori with an 
intent to oppose characteristics to obtain a perfect list of opposing traits and a couple of 
examples in mind - input processes most notably (Fodor, 1983) -, but they fail to encompass 
the diversity of the cognitive processes - everything that would fall in between 'input 
processes' and 'higher cognition' in Fodor's account. This impression cornes from the many 
problems identified thus far. 
3.2.1 One continuum or multiple continua? 
Following an insight along the lines of Hammond's (1996) suggestion, interpreting the 
distinction we are looking for as a continuum between 'pure Type l'and 'pure Type 2' 
processes has the potential of solving sorne of the difficulties encountered. As Osman 
explains: 
Hamrnond's (1996) cognitive continuum theory proposes that different forms of 
cognition (intuitive, analytical, common sense) are situated in relation to one another 
along a continuum that places intuitive processing at one end and analytical processing at 
the other. (Osman, 2004, 992-993) 
Yet, such a proposai also raises new questions and, eventually, new difficulties. 
A first problem that cornes to mind is that the characteristics Iisted in Table 2.2 are taken 
to be causally related (e.g. it is assumed each type forms a natural kind, as defined by 
Boyd, 1990; 1991; cf. 3.2.4). This is opposed to the very idea of a continuum, as it distorts 
the central idea of dual-process theories. Yet, as we saw earlier, dual-process theories as they 
currently stand cannot explain ail cognitive processes: while they are very useful to 
understand and explain a part of the mind, a large part of it cannot be accounted for. As 
mentioned, the crossover problem - that sorne processes have characteristics from both 
columns of Tables 2.2 and 2.3 - is unavoidable. 
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A clear advantage of the idea of a continuum is that it allows this mix of sorne of the 
characteristics of Tables 2.2 and 2.3 in order to characterize correctly a controlled mechanism 
demanding low effort, or a domain general unconscious process, if such mechanisms were to 
be identified. We would not need to classify it in either rigid version of Type 1 or 2 - thus 
eliminating the need of a new category such as 'Type 3 processes' to characterize the control 
of attention as in Evans' (2009) account, or more generally a category defined with 
characteristics from both columns. 
Dual-process theories, in an account based on a continuum, would help us identify these 
archetypes correctly and allow us to classify cognitive processes as being far or close to each 
of these archetypes, with a precise description of each process. We would then be able to 
c1assify correctly processes from one extreme to another - from a perfectly autonomous 
process like perceiving shapes to a rather reflective process like understanding a complex 
philosophical paper. Researchers could then have a tool allowing for a better understanding 
of crossovers, without having to assume that exceptions are rare (as does 
Samuels, 2009, 140), as weil as processes that are badJy understood when forced into either 
side of the dual-process distinction. 
This perspective does not undermine the relevance of dual-process theories: it might 
even help us to reconcile many approaches to dual-process theories that might diverge only in 
appearance, e.g. because they put their emphasis on one element rather than another 
(e.g. Stanovich, 2009 and Evans, 2009 suggesting a different 'third' type or system). The idea 
1 advance here is that processes truly dual (processes that, when compared, have opposed 
characteristics) would still be opposed (each at one extreme of the continuum), and the 
'Continuum' framework would thus preserve the central intuitions of current dual-process 
theories. Placed in such a 'Continuum' account, it would also be possible to characterize, 
without losing the explanatory power of the very useful frameworks provided by dual­
process theories, the processes that are hard to identify with one of the two lists of 
characteristics. l believe that the theories suggesting modifications to the initial forms of 
dual-process theories, such as Stanovich's (both 2004 and 2009) or Evans' (2009) might end 
up as two strongly similar theories in this 'Continuum' account. The existence of 'in­
between' processes also highlights sorne of the difficulties encountered by 
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Lieberman's (2007; 2009) account, viz. that even if many characteristics are strongly causally 
connected, there is evidence that it is not true for ail of the characteristics presented in 
Table 2.3 (e.g. Stanovich's, 2009 distinction between the autonomous and the reflective mind 
is to explain why sorne processes he attributed - in 2004 - to S2 do not correlate with general 
intelligence, while it is a characteristic assumed to be linked with S2 in many accounts, 
cf. Table 2.2). 
However, this idea of a continuum has an important problem: classifYing processes along 
a continuum may be a nice idea in theory, but in practice we have to explain how we should 
proceed to this classification, and justifY our choice. It is not as easy as it may seem. Since 
most processes are nonstandard with respect to the Type 1 / Type 2 distinction, and vary on 
different characteristics (e.g. the difference is not only about consciousness, viz., they do not 
necessarily vary, at once, on al! characteristics attributed to a given 'Type'), determining 
which properties has what effect on the classification is far from being straightforward. 
Should we posit that two processes that diverge on only one characteristic at the same 
position in the continuum, or should we consider that there is one characteristic (e.g. 
automaticity) more intluential than another (e.g. domain specificity) on whether one process 
is closer to archetypal Type 1 processes? This problem is, 1 believe, impossible to solve in a 
framework where we only include a one dimensional continuum and that is why we have, 
ultimately, to reject Hammond's (1996) proposaI. 
However, this problem can be easily solved by posing a conceptual space, a set of 
perpendicular continua. Each characteristic has different effects and an interesting and 
heuristic representation of this complexity is conceptual spaces (Gardenfors, 200047). My 
proposaI is that the characteristics presented in Table 2.2 should all be understood as continua 
and that, together, they form an n-dimensional conceptual space, where n is the number of 
characteristics considered (the number of continua forming the conceptual space). 
47 In his book, Gardenfors uses conceptual spaces to model representations. My goal is different, 
but Gardenfors' proposai, to use "conceptual spaces as a framework for representations" (2000, 4), is 
interesting to conceive how to describe, represent and classify cognitive processes. 
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ln such a conceptual space, we can ascribe a position to the cognitive processes that are 
studied. Once ail processes are posited in the conceptual space, we might find that they form 
identifiable clusters, reflecting but not limited to the various types that have been proposed. 1 
will briefly discuss the value we should attribute to n, the importance of frontiers and clusters 
in this conceptual space and the place of the Type 1 / Type 2 distinction in my framework. 1 
will then consider sorne advantages of my view before examining what could arguably be 
considered the most controversial characteristics of Table 2.2. 
3.2.2 What is n's value? 
The first thing to consider before we elaborate this kind of conceptual space is the 
number of dimensions that researchers will need to take into account. The view 1 present here 
is tentative as 1 do not have a clear answer to this question. The answer will, mostly, come 
from empirical studies - as it will depend of whether we can, or not, distinguish a given 
characteristic from the other: only being able to do this distinction conceptually is not 
enough. 
My view does not reject the possibility that sorne characteristics co-occur most of the 
time, and it does not undermine the importance and relevance of sorne co-varying 
characteristics: the idea that characteristics must be distinguished from one another rather 
means that they should be distinguishable at least in principle, but preferabll8 in actual, 
verifiable, situations. Is the unconscious character of a process the same thing as its implicit 
functioning? Is being the default process the same as being automatic, and are those 
characteristics necessary in order to be fast? Are ail processes that are independent of general 
intelligence also independent of working memory? We can distinguish most of these 
concepts from one another, but it may be possible that, in practice, they are the same 
characteristic that, because of CUITent ignorance, we identify with two different labels. There 
48 It is conceivable, but not desirable, that in a given case we might have very good reasons to 
preserve a distinction between two characteristics co-varying perfectly. 
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are dozens of questions like these we will need to answer before having an appropriate and 
useful description of the processes, sorne of them conceptual and a priori, but most empirica1. 
However, it is important to note that specifying what are the 'correct' characteristics we 
should consider is, in this framework, less crucial than it was in Samuels' account. He 
submits the problem this way: 
Should we invoke, for example, a distinction between paraI lei and seriai processes, as 
Sloman does (1996), or should we resist this suggestion, as Evans does (2008)? Mutatis 
mutandis for conscious versus unconscious, controlled versus automatic, evolutionarily 
ancient versus novel, and sa on. (Samuel s, 2009, 139) 
For Samuels, this identification of the correct characteristics was an important problem with 
potentially significant consequences. Excluding or including one set of characteristics instead 
of the other could radically change the proposed account of these 'Types' - for instance, 
considering parallelism as a criteria for SI or Type 1 potentially excluded sorne processes 
from the system or the type. This is not the case in a conceptual space account, as a redundant 
dimension would not change much in the clustering of processes and, if it did have effects on 
the clusters, it is either a sign we undervalued the importance a characteristic has for a certain 
set of processes, or that the characteristic should be excluded because it is inappropriate (e.g. 
it would be the case with evolutionary recency according to Samuels, 2009, 140). 
Thus, if we examine redundant dimensions in my framework, we should be able to 
identify them (in the sense of making them one) as every process examined will plot at 'the 
same place' on the two respective axes; we would get a perfect correlation49•5o . It might also 
turn out that sorne characteristics are less interesting - for example, they might have Jess 
49 This is the main idea behind principal component analysis: highly correlated dimensions 
(components) are fused to leave on1y the set ofmaximally uncorrelated (Le. orthogonal) dimensions. 
50 There is a simple algorithm we could begin research with: starting with Table 2.2, as elaborated 
by Evans (2008), or something similar, we determine which dimensions correlate strongly and merge 
them and, when new characteristics appear in the literature, we add new dimensions to the space. The 
iteration of this algorithm offers a construct and manages the space. Thanks to Pierre Poirier for this 
suggestion. 
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explanatory power - than others that better capture sorne aspects of the processes 
investigated, and these cou Id be eliminated as weil. 1 will elaborate on this point in 3.2.4 and 
in 3.3.3. 
1 believe identifying the set of the most important characteristics will be made easier 
with this account of dual-process theories, more so if there are systematic examinations of the 
characteristics. Maybe sorne axis will be binary, but most will, 1 believe, be true continua. 
For instance, automaticity is not a question of being automatic or not, while sorne other 
processes are partly automatic, sorne others are automatic, but just sometimes (e.g. the 
control of breathing). Since there is at least three possibilities for the 'automatic / controlled' 
characterization, a continuum will offer a more accurate description of the analyzed process. 
It is important to note that, in these cases, plotting a process at a certain point of a given 
continuum is not an easy task, but with more and more processes placed in the conceptual 
space, the comparisons between diverse processes will become easier to do. The idea is not 
that the place of a process on a continuum is an absolute characterization (e.g. 'Process X 
is 77% conscious') that identifies properties, as it would be impossible to determine. The idea 
advanced here is rather that it is a heuristic classification enabling us to understand better the 
process in question in relation with other cognitive processes ('This process should be at 77% 
on the consciousness axis as it is more than x but less than y'). A similar move is made by 
'traditional' dual-process theories: input modules, in Fodor (1983), had certain characteristics 
only useful when comparing them to higher cognition (e.g. 'being fast' is a characteristic we 
can only attribute ifthere are sorne slow processes), and similar characterizations are found in 
other accounts of the two systems or types of processes. 
Given a number of dimensions - that 1 will Jeave undetermined in this dissertation - in 
which we place and compare different processes, the important question now becomes: does 
the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes still has a purpose? 
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3.2.3 Frontiers and c1usters 
Multidimensional spaces are hard to grasp and their complexity is impossible to 
represent (completely and c1early) on paper. However, there are a number of mathematical 
tools that can be used to represent them and use them in a useful and intelligible way. 1do not 
wish to enter in the details such an account could have: my goal is only to sketch the general 
idea of what a conceptual space of processes could look like, and how it cou Id be useful to 
further current research on dual-process theories. Most of the ideas related to prototypes here 
are inspired by the connectionist framework (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2001; Eliasmith and 
Anderson, 2002) as there are very useful tools in this framework. Figure 3.1, adapted from an 
illustration of a leamed partition of a hidden-unit activation-vector space 
(Churchland, 1989, 169 & 203), is an example of the kind of conceptual space that could 
result of the consideration ofthree characteristics (e.g. speed, automaticity and parallelism). 
Each dimension is the continuum of a given characteristic, each prototype process is the 
center of a cluster of processes and each side of the divider in the center would mean the 
process is classified as either (Proto)Type 1 or as (Proto)Type 2. Of course, the actual 
conceptual space that would result from the consideration of automaticity, speed and 
conscious character is rnost probably very different from Figure 3.1, but this is used only to 
i II ustrate my idea. 
There is a strong chance, according to the current evidence we have (Evans, 2008; Evans 
and Frankish, 2009; Stanovich, 2009; Toates, 2006) that clusters would form in this space, 
viz. most processes would be grouped together when they have many characteristics of 
Type 1 or many characteristics of Type 2 in cornmon. However, exceptions would still be 
possible and they would occupy other positions in the conceptual space: but we would still be 
able to classify them as Type 1 or 2, if necessary. We might even find that there are two 
(or more) types of Type 1 processes (e.g. the old and evolutionary, and the recent and 
modularized, cf. 3.3 .2). The main advantage of this view is that it preserves the specificities 
of each process, but that we can still qualify it as being of a given type if necessary 
(cf. 3.3.1). And it lets determination of the amount and organization of 'Type-structure' to be 
determined empirically. 
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Even if a process is not precisely in the area occupied by the prototype, the conceptual 
space allows us to simplify for the means of explanation, or to sketch a quick portrait of the 
situation when needed. The divider at the center of Figure 3.] represents the frontier between 
Type 1 and Type 2: on one side it would be classified as Type 1 by the algorithm, and it 
would be described as Type 2 in the second half (cf. 3.2.4 for a more thorough description). 
The divider is not a plane: the distinction between Type] and Type 2 will probably not be 
linear, as it will depend of each of the characteristics considered. We should be able, in such 
a conceptual space, to determine if one characteristic has more impact than another on 
whether a process should be considered to be Type] or Type 2. 
This frontier however is not absolute. A process that appears c1early on the divider or 
near it would be partly Type], partly Type 2 in almost equal respects. Should we then force 
the process in either one of the categories? Why would we? What is clear is that the 
distinction between the types of processes is not binary. We can easily imagine the difference 
between types as a sigmoid function (cf. Figure 3.2) in which the magnitude of the curve will 
only be revealed by more research. We can also suppose there will be a grey area near the 
divider, an area in which a process would be categorized as both, or neither type. Moreover, 
the division between types in this grey zone, as many distinctions made in fuzzy systems, 
might also depend on the relations of the analyzed process with other processes and with the 
environment. For example, when categorizing a Type 2 process that is becoming more and 
more automatized, it might be preferable to compare it to other acquired Type 1 processes. 
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Figure 3.1 Prototypes of Type 1 and 2 processes and frontier in a three-dimensional 
conceptual space. (Adapted from Bickle, Mandik and Landreth, 2010, Figure 3.) 
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Figure 3.2 Illustration of a projection of the position of various processes (one shown) along 
a given continuum (e.g. automatic / controlled, where 0% is not controlled at ail, and 100% is fully 
controlled) in the conceptual space with their classification as Type 1 or Type 2 process, showing 
the grey zone between each type. 
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3.2.4 Type 1 and Type 2 as a heuris tic distinction 
If the framework presented above is accepted, the Type 1 / Type 2 distinction acquires a 
new rneaning (or, less controversially, it is at the very least represented in a different way). 
From a characterization of processes, it becomes the localization of a process in a complex 
conceptual space, divided in (at least) two regions. These regions are more or less defined: 
depending on the characteristics we find once the conceptual space is elaborated and we 
describe the clusters forming in this conceptual space. It is not clear however what a given 
region of the conceptual space identifiesSI • 
The problem we face here is one of identification of natural kinds. Does the Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes distinction (whether it is in rny conceptual space account or in 
Sarnuels', 2009 account of dual-process theories) map, or not, to a distinction we can reliably 
use in psychology and in neuroscience? 
To use Machery's characterization of natural kinds inspired from 
Boyd's (1990; 1991) -, natural kinds are objects sharing a large set of properties, they 
possess these properties because of sorne causal mechanisms and this set of properties has to 
be specific to these objects (adapted from Machery, 2009, 241). Thus, the tw052 questions we 
must answer affirmatively to identif)t a natural kind are the following: "Are there c1usters 
forming?" and "Do these clusters have many characteristics in common because of a causal 
mechanism?" In the previous sections, l argued that, while we can probably answer the first 
question positively, although there might be more than just two c1usters, it remains to be seen 
ifthis is also the case for the second question. 
51 It will also vary if there are more than two regions identified, for instance, if we were to find 
four very useful C!usters. 
52 The specificity criterion is less interesting in this context. Still, it will be satisfied automatically 
by the conceptual space itself, as we will be able to see it if there are two processes sharing the exact 
same set of properties. 
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We can offer no affirmative answer for the 'Systems' accounts, nor should we, at least 
for the moment, expect an affirmative answer for Type 1 and Type 2 processes53 • If many 
processes form a cluster, we will be able to search for the underlying causal mechanism of 
these processes, and the chances are the underlying causal mechanism will vary from one 
c1uster to the other - for instance, Fodor-Iike input modules bringing about a representation 
and a reasoning process producing a particular intuition might involve very different causal 
mechanisms. In any case, we must understand each process and what role it plays ln our 
cognitive architecture. 
While elaborating the conceptual space 1 suggest, we might find out that the distinction 
between Type 1 and Type 2 processes identifies a natural kind, or not. In the first case, my 
framework is useful to see the relations between each type and to characterize properly each 
process according to its specificities and mapping them in the appropriate region of the 
conceptual space (but, as 1 argued in 3.1; 1 think it is unlikely that an account similar to 
Samuels', 2009 has the potential to explain ail cognitive processes, mostly because of the 
problem of crossover characteristics, cf. 3.1 and 3.3.1). It can, as weil, be useful to refine the 
characteristics and the criteria used. 1 suspect however that it will not be the case that the 
Type 1 / Type 2 distinction 'carves the nature at its joints.' 
However, if the distinction does not identifY natural kinds, should we reject it 
completely? As 1 emphasized through 2.2, 1 think Carruthers' (2006; 2009) account does not 
go in the right direction because of the problems 1 identified and objections 1 raised to his too 
weak notion of module and to his account of the reaJization of S2. Still, Carruthers identifies 
sorne important properties of at least sorne Type 2 processes: there are certainly sorne of 
these processes realized in multiple iterations of Type 1 processes, and action-rehearsal most 
probably has a role to play in sorne of them. It is not, however, the whole story. 
53 The case for or against this Type 1 / Type 2 distinction being a natural kind is certainly not 
complete, but 1 did cast sorne doubts on it. If Type 1 and Type 2 processes identify natural kinds, it 
will become c1ear with the conceptual space. This framework will help us find the shared properties 
and the causal mechanism(s). 
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An elimination of the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes could be 
desirable if we were to find no clustering at ail in the conceptual space. However, as 1 
mentioned previously, it is almost certain that we will find sorne clustering as many processes 
are alike. Marcus (2004) offers even more evidence with his suggestion that similar neural 
structures are often found as genes replicate, at least initially in the course of evolution, the 
same structures over and over. Another reason in favor of keeping the distinction is important 
to invoke: the models offered in sorne accounts of dual-process theories such as Evans' or 
Stanovich's models in psychology of reasoning, or Lieberman's very rich and interesting 
framework (cf. Chapter II), "has generated a wide array of fruitful explanations for many 
phenomena." (Samuels, 2009, 138) 
The difficulties encountered by these models are somewhat small compared to their 
advantages, and the goal of my suggestion is to provide tools to amend CUITent dual-process 
theories and ease the reso1ution of sorne of the difficulties identified, and finally to get to the 
bottom of sorne of the problems of these theories (and, hopefully, find a way to rectify these 
frameworks). 1 identified many such problems and difficulties in this dissertation, and 1 am 
certain there are many more to discover, as sorne accounts (e.g. Lieberman's, Samuels') are 
still in their infancy. 
1 must emphasize the point 1 made in the last paragraph, as it is a potential source of 
misunderstanding. 1 do not argue for the elimination of notions such as 'module,' or 'Type l' 
and 'Type 2' processes, although my framework provides the tools to add precision to the 
definition of these notions, or even to eliminate it, if needed. The model suggested here is just 
a different, and 1 believe better, way to conceptualize how and why sorne processes are very 
similar, and how and why they differ from other cognitive processes. Discussions about 
modules are very fruitful, and Fodor's (1983) work opened the door to many inquiries. These 
discussions, and many others related to dual-process theories, also gave us very important 
tools to ana1yze sorne empirical results: it would be a tremendous error to throw out the 
proverbial baby with the bath water. 
In my view, if we integrate the conceptual space to our thinking about dual-process 
theories, it will, at first, bring us to consider the distinction between 'Type l'and 'Type 2' 
77 
processes as only a heuristic distinction, viz. a distinction that has no other purposes than 
being useful in designing experiments and interpreting the results. In other words, not only 
does this distinction is not taken to identify natural kinds, but this distinction gives rise (or, at 
least, has the potential to cause) major confusions and errors. One of the most striking one, 1 
believe, is the potential conflation of Fodor-modules, or processes that are very close to what 
is identified with this notion, with skills acquired by experts and with perceptual-motor tasks, 
that - after a lot of training - become very much alike modules (cf. Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1986; Fitts and Posner, 1967; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). 1 will return on this 
important distinction in 3.3 .2. 
The key point here is that 1 do not claim there is only one type of 'Type l' processes, nor 
do 1 c1aim there is only one type of 'Type 2' processes. Maybe sorne important notions will 
be confirmed - 1 believe Fodor-modules is one very likely example of processes that will 
cluster strongly in the conceptual space -, maybe sorne others will be replaced, etc. It might 
also give evidence for (or against) Carruthers' idea of SI and S2 having no deep functional 
differences. We might in effect see sorne of the S2 processes cluster in a region that can be 
reduced to the iterated activation of SI processes. Maybe the conceptual space will confirm 
that sorne processes appearing to be exceptions not possible to include in sorne of the 
frameworks presented in this dissertation are not really exceptions after ail. As 1 mentioned at 
the beginning of 3.2, only more research (and using the conceptual space!) can confirm or 
infirrn much of the claims made by dual-process theories. 
This framework also has other important advantages that 1 will describe in the next 
section. 
3.3 Some advantages ofthis view 
1 see at least six major advantages to my view over the current Type 1 / Type 2 
dichotomy (as in Samuels, 2009). First, the categories we use would be justified by the 
position in the conceptual space of the processes we regroup under them. The fact that the 
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processes have more or less the same position in the conceptual space and that their position 
differs from the emplacement of other processes in the conceptual space (cf. 3.2.4) illustrates 
how sinùlar these processes are between them and how they differ from other processes, not 
comprised under the same category. Second, Type 1 / Type 2 will not be seen as a dichotomy 
anymore. The dual character of sorne processes explained by dual-process theories would 
remain, as there would most probably be similar dualities than those already identified in the 
1iterature (as in Table 2.2), but sorne intermediate processes can be allowed (cf. 3.3.1). The 
'Continuum' account and the conceptual space do not undermine the explanatory power of 
dual-process theories, but these two accounts place the CUITent accounts in a wider 
framework, a framework where it is possible to explain the processes that are not explained 
by dual-process theories. The distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes in the 
suggested conceptua1 space is not 'either-or' anymore, a requirement of dual-process theories 
that prevents the explanation of many processes. A third advantage, related to the second one, 
is that the 'two systems' used in the CUITent literature are, most probably, no longer seen as 
the only two notions to explain the entire mind (all of its processes). Il puts an end to the 
binary and oversimplified dual-process theories (cf. Evans, 2008, 270), sorne of which have a 
central role in the literature (cf. Chapter II). Fourth, as mentioned at the end of last section, 
my framework allows an explanation of acquisition and automatization of sorne skills after 
much training and repetition (cf. 3.3.2). Sorne processes are initially 'Type 2' but they 
gradually acquire characteristics attributed to Type 1 processes, such as automaticity and the 
possibility that they function unconsciously (e.g. riding a bicycle, playing chess, reading, 
understanding a language, etc.). Il is also possible for a processus to go in the other direction, 
viz. from Type 2 to Type i (demodularization). Fifth, the conceptual space will allow us to 
verify and elaborate new and interesting hypotheses - by manipulating the conceptual space, 
for example by adding or removing characteristics (i.e. dimensions) to see the effect, 
researchers will be able to have a better grasp of how the nùnd works (cf. 3.3.3). Lastly, 
while the structure offered by dual-process theories, whether a given theory uses the 'Si / S2' 
or the 'Type 1 / Type 2' distinction, brings researcher to make unjustified assumptions such 
as believing that a controlled process will be linked to language and general intelligence 
while it is sornetimes not the case (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich and West, 2008), the 
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conceptual space account would allow researchers to see in details which characteristics are 
co-varying and which do not. 
3.3.1 Crossovers: mixing characteristics 
With the characteristics listed in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 taken individually, and not seen as a 
set of necessarily co-varying properties (even if many of those properties often co-vary), it is 
possible, with the conceptual space, to understand better sorne processes that have 
characteristics from both columns (a process encapsulated but slow, etc.). Moreover, it is 
possible to preserve (and maybe even retine) the explanations of the traditional dual-process 
theories or those provided by frameworks such as the Evolutionary Psychologists'. 
This point is crucial, and it is hard to understand why Samuels (2009) argues that 
'crossover' processes, viz. processes having characteristics that are in the tirst column and 
characteristics that are in the second one at the same time, are rare. Whether they are rare or 
not is not the point that should be made: such processes exist and even though their number 
might be small (maybe it is not), they are an important part of cognition. For example, Evans' 
proposed Type 3 is essential for the coherence of many of the dual-process theories 
themselves (cf. Evans, 2007; Evans, 2009, 47-48). Furthermore, as we have seen with 
Machery's quote earlier (p. 64), the existence of processes that have crossover characteristics 
is one of the reasons why many researchers in cognitive science reject the extremely useful 
and rich framework offered by the many dual-process theories (or why they only adopt a 
view using sorne of the intuitions behind dual-process theories, e.g. when de Sousa, 2010 
refers to this literature with the expression 'two-track mind'). 
However, sorne might see my proposition as a departure from dual-process theories 
because, as we have seen (cf. 2.1), current dual-process theories share two tenets: that the 
distinctions made in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 align and that a given process is either part of SI or 
of S2 (or, in Samuels' account, either Type 1 or Type 2). My view goes against this 'canon' 
on both counts. l do not see this as a problem since, as l argued thus far, accounts sharing 
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these prineiples are unable to account for some cognitive processes. But why still calI it a 
dual-process theory? 
Samuels' appeal to exp/anatory keep hoIds part of the answer. My account does not 
restrain the current theories in any way: it only places them in a larger and richer framework. 
It is thus possible to retain the advantages and explanations offered by Stanovich's or Evans' 
accounts, but evade much of the problems they encounter (at least, those 1 identified here). In 
this way, it is possible to keep the explanation of the processes that are dual, like some 
phenomena discussed in the psychology of reasoning, and have room to explain processes 
that do not fit in a framework inferred from data coming from these experimental paradigms 
(e.g. Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; 2005). 
3.3.2 The modularization of Type 2 processes 
Expertise is a wide topie 1 cannot fully coyer in these pages. However, 1 need to say how 
it cou Id be accounted for in the conceptual space that 1 am suggesting here - especially 
because il can be. Many dual-process theories mention expertise and the automatization of 
some processes, but these authors offer no explanation (or, at least, no detailed account) in 
their framework for how the acquisition of new characteristics or how the shift from one side 
of Tables 2.2 and 2.3 to the other happens. For example, Stanovich states that "processes can 
acquire the property of autonomy" (Stanovich, 2004, 38) and he illustrates this phenomenon 
a few pages later with the Stroop effect. Yet, he offers no explanation of how this fits in his 
dual-process account. 
What 1 claim here is a bit stronger: if dual-process theorists wanted to give a fully 
detailed account of the automatization of some proeesses they would encounter 
insurmountable difficulties that they could only resolve by modifying some of their basic 
assumptions. The first difficulty these authors would come across is that it is not possible in 
their framework to explain why there is a change in one characteristic but not necessarily in 
the others. Remember that in current dual-process theories, characteristics are assumed to 
aJign. In fact, not ail characteristics change at the same time or at the same rate, and sorne 
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never change when one is learning and repeating a new ability. The second difficulty wou Id 
be to account for the graduaI nature of these changes, since a process cannot be partly Type 1 
and partly Type 2: it can only be either one. Sorne of the processes 'in transition' have in this 
sense a curious behavior current dual-process theories cannot explain (cf. Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1986, chapter 1 for the first two difficulties). A third difficulty is mentioned by 
Samuels (2009, 140) when he discusses which, if any, characteristic should be dropped from 
Table 2.2: as he explains, the characteristic of evolutionary recency is incompatible with the 
idea of such an automatized Type 2 process like reading (while it is a much more useful 
notion in the context of thinking about Type 1 processes as using heuristics). Reading is, at 
first, very hard and complex to execute. A child who just learned how to read has to make 
much effort to understandwhat s/he is reading (or imagine you were learning to read Chinese 
characters). Decoding each syllable (or ideogram) takes ail of the attention, as it is executed 
in a seriai manner, and there is no attention left to decode what meaning lies behind these 
syllables. With time, decoding the syllables becomes easier and a proficient reader will 
execute this task just as easily as s/he perceives the written word and its color 
(without 'decoding' it), thus explaining much of the Stroop effect. But this acquisition of 
reading skills does not fit neatly in current dual-process theories54 . 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992), in her book revisiting the notion of 'Fodor-modules' presents 
what she calls 'modularization,' and her description is very close to what 1 have in mind here. 
She gives the example of someone learning to play the piano: 
54 And it remains true even if we drop evolutionary recency as the flrst two problems remain. 
However, most CUITent dual-process theories use evolution as an important factor in their classification 
Ce.g. Carruthers, 2006; Stanovich 2004). 
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When one is learning to play the piano, initially there is a period during which a 
sequence of separate notes is laboriously practiced. This is followed by a period during 
which chunks of several notes are played together as blocks, untiJ finally the whole piece 
can be played more or less automatically. It is something like this that 1 shall 
subsequently call "reaching behavioral mastery." But the automaticity is constrained by 
the fact that the leamer can neither start in the middJe of the piece nor play variations on 
a theme [... ] It is only after a period of behavioral mastery that the pianist can generate 
variations on a theme, [... ] The end result is representational flexibility and control, 
which allows for creativity. Aiso important is the fact that the earlier proceduralized 
capacity is not lost: for certain goals, the pianist can cali on the automatic skill; for 
others, he or she calls on the more explicit representations that allow for flexibility and 
creativity. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, 16) 
This description parallels the acquisition of many other ski Ils, including writing and 
reading for example, but also chess playing, the acquisition of expertise in a workplace (it 
accounts for the acquisition of skills from that of chicken-sexers, cf. Pritchard, 2005, to the 
skills of physicians and nurses), driving a car or a bicycle, and so on55 . Karmiloff-Smith here 
identifies only a few stages, but Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) identified five levels of 
proficiency: novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient and expert (Fitts and 
Posner, 1967 presented three such stages). These stages, used to explain intellectual skills or 
functions also parallel very weil how perceptual-motor expertise is acquired (Rosenbaum, 
Augustyn, Cohen and Jax, 2006), viz. actions we make everyday such as picking objects up, 
but also other actions that seem very easy to us like walking, moving the lips and tongue to 
55 For Karmiloff-Smith (1992) ail modules are 'constructed' in this fashion; according to her 
account, only attentional biases can explain how modules are developed. This is an interesting claim, 
but it is not one l have to endorse or to reject: my suggestion is compatible with both accounts. 
If there are innate modules Ce.g. 'true' Type l processes), as it is usually understood by 
Evolutionary Psychologists, these would most probably appear in the conceptual space as a different 
cluster. If Karmiloff-Smith is right however, my prediction is that there would be no differences 
between modules assumed to be innate and those assumed to be acquired. 
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produce a given sound, etc., suggesting that a similar transition from Type 2 to Type 156 
occurs across many cognitive processes. 
While this description seems very hard to account for in current duaJ-process theories57, 
it fits weil in my framework: it allows that sorne of the characteristics of a process can change 
in given circumstances. As the process modularizes, we only have to examine which 
characteristic(s) changes and map the process anew. We can then follow the evoJution of the 
skill's mastery. These processes, initially Type 2 (as defined in the conceptual space), 
gradually and continuously acquire more and more Type 1 characteristics. 1 believe the 
conceptual space can be a very interesting and rich way to interpret the analysis made by 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), but this is ground for further research. What is important here is 
that the framework 1 suggest offers ground for reinterpreting the research already done, and 
opens the door for new investigations. 
3.3.3 Working with a conceptual space 
More generally, using the conceptual space might have vanous advantages and an 
important pragmatic aspect in that it can solve current problems in the literature and it can be 
used to test hypotheses and advance inquiries. It also opens the door to new kinds of 
inquiries. 1 want to elaborate a bit on this idea. 
As mentioned earlier, conceptual spaces have a variety of interesting properties and 
manipulating them can bring us to see the processes under a new perspective. Not only would 
56 It may be possible that the reverse path happens, that a Type l process becomes Type 2, but in 
the vast majority of the cases discussed in the literature such a control of automatic processes is only 
possible indirectly Ce.g. creating the appropriate setting to trigger given Type 1 processes; cf. Poirier 
and Beaulac, in preparation). After a period during which there is no practice, it might be harder to use 
a process that had been automatized, but 1would not say the process has returned to be 'Type 2'. 
57 And it would most probably be ad hoc since, as 1 mentioned earlier, there is nothing in their 
framework allowing such modifications / transitions in the classification of a given process. 
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it be possible to identify clusters in this conceptual space, but it would also be possible to 
discover new c1usters (or even interesting 'subclusters,' viz. groups of processes within a 
cluster that has interesting properties for a given theory or explanation) we currently have no 
way of predicting. For example, if a distribution of processes looks like what is illustrated in 
Figure 3.2, we might find useful and interesting to refer to the processes in the grey zone with 
a different label - or modify the way we talk about sorne of these 'in between' processes: for 
instance, the Type 3 Evans predicts we need in order to explain preattentive processes could 
be distinguished from a process that is only partly automatized. We would also understand, at 
least partly, the differences between these processes in the grey zone as we would have a 
precise characterization of their peculiarities, giving us an idea of why they cannot be 
explained with other accounts of dual-process theories. 
Another possibility brought by this conceptual space framework is its manipulation: 
modifying it in various ways such as adding new dimensions or removing existing ones 
might reveal previously unknown features. The resulting conceptual space might be very 
different from the initial one; new c1usters might appear, sorne might disappear, two 
apparently very different processes might be distinguished more sharply, and so on. The 
conceptual space can, in this manner, be a tool to test new hypotheses, to compare processes, 
to do research and try to explain and understand the mind. With this powerful tool that keeps 
the specificities of the processes it classifies, we might be able to take our understanding to a 
new level. 
Resolving the unity problem is a concrete example where the manipulation of the 
conceptual space could be useful. With current tools, it is hard to identify the unifying 
characteristic of a given 'Type;' however, by removing sorne dimensions of the conceptual 
space and verifying if a given cluster is stiJl to be found we have a first tool to identify these 
crucial characteristics. A second way to discriminate the weight of the characteristics would 
be to identify which are the characteristics that co-vary most strongly and find correlations 
with other fields of inquiry (e.g. neuroscience). This might not completely solve the unity 
problem - 1 only offer a tool that can help with this goal -, but 1 believe it is an interesting 
path to follow. 
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These remarks are, of course, speculative. However, none of the advantages l identified 
here is too far fetch: until now we did not have a similar way to map our knowledge of 
cognitive processes. Only using and elaborating this space will allow us to see where it can 
bring future research on the various dual-process theories currently in the literature 
(cf. Table 2.1). 
3.4 Conclusion 
ln this chapter, l argued that Samuels' (2009) account of dual-process theories, while 
very interesting, has problems very similar to those of the other dual-process theories, 
discussed in Chapter II. However, the rejection of Samuels' account does not amount to a 
rejection of dual-process theories: l suggested that we could understand the Type 1 / Type 2 
distinction as a continuum (Hammond, 1996), before putting forward reasons to doubt the 
adequacy of this idea. One continuum is not enough to take into account the complexity of 
cognitive processes, and we must therefore use many continua that will form an 
n-dimensional conceptual space where we will be able to place the processes and, eventually 
(hopefully!), identify c1usters. Much of this discussion is speculative as this framework is 
currently not implemented in research, but l argued for several advantages of using such a 
powerful tool, such as its ability to model processes having crossover characteristics and the 
basis it offers to discuss how sorne processes change from Type 2 to Type 1. 
Whether the difference between Type 1 and Type 2 is 'deep functional' or not couId 
most probably be resolved depending on how the processes are c1ustering in the conceptual 
space. Tt is also possible that we will find different types of Type 1 processes, for example 
Fodor-modules and expert abilities. The only certitude that remains is the phenomenological 
difference Carruthers identified: sorne cognitive processes feel very different from others ­
although we could also imagine that two different Type 1 processes can feel different from 
one another. A lot of research still has to be done if we want to have a better understanding of 
the important difference identified by dual-process theories. 
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In the worst case scenario, the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes is an 
interesting heuristic model that allows us to understand better sorne functional differences 
between processes (more or less what Carruthers, 2009 is suggesting). However, in the best 
of situations (the best for current dual-process theories, at the very least), the perspective 
offered by the conceptual space framework will be a key to illustrate and understand the 
duality of the mind that has been put forward by the dual-process theories. It will also be 
possible to understand and explain the processes that are not part of either Type, without 
'forcing' them into a category in which they do not belong. 
CONCLUSION
 
As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter II, dual-process theories are widely discussed 
and many researchers adopt a framework along the lines of these theories. There is no 
consensus however on the form these 'dual processes' should take, or which version of the 
theory is the most interesting. Sorne of these frameworks attracted a lot of attention and had 
quite an influence, such as Samuels' (2009) suggestion to divide the rnind into two 'Types of 
processes,' instead of using the usual two 'Systems' as advocated in many of the initial 
dual-process / dual-system frameworks. The influence of Samuels' account is not surprising: 
his two way collapse, the collapse of both SI and S2 into 'Types,' is an interesting solution to 
many problems of dual-process theories but, as l argued in 3.1, it is not enough to 'save' 
them. This is why l elaborated and suggested the conceptual space account in 3.2, as both a 
solution to the quibbles about 'module' and those about SI / S2 or Type 1 / Type 2. This 
framework allows for a new exarnination of cognitive processes, and it contributes to a new 
way of defining the important notions of the field. 
My take-home message would go like this: dual-process theories are very useful and 
interesting frameworks that provide us with explanations for many cognitive phenomena. 
Yet, they have important limitations and they cannot explain ail of cognition: this is why we 
need to integrate these theories into a more comprehensive framework, like the one l tried ta 
create in 3.2. This tool has the potential of offering interesting insights into the peculiarities 
of the mind. 
Before arriving at this conclusion however, my argument had two major steps: l first 
discussed what 'module' means and, then, l examined what exactly the dual-process theorists 
are claiming, before putting the accent on the main shortcoming of their theories: the inability 
to offer a framework explaining ail cognitive processes. 
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In Chapter l, l explored and tried to make sense of the debates around what 'module' 
means, or rather what it should mean. After a presentation of Fodor's very own 'Type l,' 
Fodor-modules, and a discussion of how Evolutionary Psychologists began to also use the 
same notion, l argued there were many unresolved issues in both of these accounts, sorne of 
which Carruthers (2006) tries to address. l then described and criticized Carruthers' strong 
central modularity account, and l defended Samuels' (2006) more plausible weak central 
modularity hypothesis. This account, as l showed, is more or less another way to describe the 
mind as having dual processes, viz. the modular parts that are working in parallel and are fast, 
automatic, unconscious, etc. and central cognition, including sorne modular parts58 , is 
described as slow, seriai, controlled, conscious, etc. This is not unlike Fodor's (1983) 
proposai, and l believe dual-process theories can be a wider framework to think about 
modules. In fact, even for a massive modularist like Carruthers (2006; 2009), white there is 
for him no deep functional difference between SI and S2, recognizing and using the notion 
of S2 to explain cognitive phenomena can be very useful, and it allows for the distinction we 
intuitively make between two types of processing since they, at least, feel very different. 
Chapter II was the ground for my critique of sorne of the proposed dual-process theories. 
l first explored what this family of theories is, before examining four important theories that 
are associated with this trend: Carruthers' (2009), Lieberman's (2007; 2009; Satpute and 
Lieberman, 2006), Stanovich's (especially his 2009 account) and Evans' (2009). By trying to 
explain cognition with a clear distinction between (only) two systems (or sets of systems/9, 
every model examined in Chapter II (and Samuels', 2009 in 3.1) encounters sorne problems 
because at least one cognitive process, or one category of cognitive processes 
(e.g. automatized Type 2 processes) does not fit in each of the models. The list of 
characteristics that the processes (or these 'Systems') are thought to have in these accounts is 
58 These 'modular parts' have some of the characteristics Fodor would have attributed to 'central 
cognition. ' 
59 Carruthers' account is, as we have seen, a bit different: for him, there really is just modules, and 
nothing else. As a reminder: S2 is realized in multiple iterations of modules (S 1). Nevertheless, his 
account is not immune ta my critique: sorne cognitive processes do not fit in his mode!. 
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just too rigid as it does not allow the explanation of processes having crossover 
characteristics. 
Finally, in Chapter III, as mentioned above, l criticized Samuels' (2009) account, 
developed my proposai of a conceptual space and highlighted sorne of its advantages over 
other frameworks in the literature. While elaborating the conceptual space account, l 
examined the Type 1 / Type 2 distinction (the most plausible form out of the different 
dual-process theories l examined here) under a new light. 
ln the end, my current hypothesis is that cognitive scientists identified an important 
distinction under the labels 'Type l'and 'Type 2,' a distinction that will most probably be 
present in the conceptual space. However, l also believe there will be other distinctions to be 
made, viz. l believe that other c1usters will appear in the conceptual space. As mentioned 
in 3.3.2, one of the most obvious partitioning in my 11Ùnd is the difference between 'natural' 
(evolved and adapted) and acquired Type 1 processes. There are most probably distinctions 
to be made in Type 2 processes as weil (e.g. Stanovich' s distinction between the algorithmic 
and reflective minds), and it would not be too surprising to find sorne c1usters we cannot even 
predict because of our CUITent ignorance of the relevant data or ill-advised efforts to fit data in 
current distinctions. 
For now however, and tbis might be seen as a very controversial c1aim, the 
Type 1 / Type 2 distinction can only be taken as a heuristic distinction, and it should be 
considered as such by researchers - hence my radical subtitle, "for a heuristic interpretation 
of dual-process theories." There is simply not enough data (and there are sorne problems such 
as those l identified in this dissertation; other researchers, such as Keren and Schul, 2009, 
also criticize the dual-process framework) to support the c1aims that dual-process theories (as 
they are curreI;ltly understood) can give us a complete understanding of the 11Ùnd. Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes are not natural kinds as they are defined in the current state of dual-process 
theories (cf. Afterword), but they remain tremendously useful in organizing thinking in sorne 
fields of inquiry, such as in the psycbology of reasoning. Yet, even if the distinction is just 
heuristic, l maintain it still identifies real differences between types of processes, but the 
available theories do not render these differences in an appropriate way. There is just no way, 
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in the CUITent state of our knowiedge about cognitive pracesses, to daim that Type 1 / Type 2 
is a naturai kind distinction and 1 hope that the conceptual space 1 defend pravides tools to 
prave otherwise. 
AFTERWORD 
WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES? 
As l mentioned more than once, my critique of many of the accounts we find in the 
dual-process theory literature is not intended to promote the idea that dual-process theories 
should be abandoned: au contraire, they should be pursued even further, but in an 
appropriate framework. l cannot stress this out too much: there are processes that are dual, 
and the evidence is overwhelming (Evans, 2008 offers a review of the literature). There is 
just no theory that currently succeeds by using only these dual processes to explain every 
cognitive process there is, and l believe it is hopeless to try elaborating such an architecture 
of the mind: this is an impossible mission, a point l made clearly in Chapter II and in 3.1. In 
short, there are dual-processes to be sure, but we have as of yet no adequate theory of 
dual-processes. We need a larger, more encompassing framework, like the one l developed 
in 3.2. 
This important caveat aside, even current dual-process theories offer a very rich and 
interesting framework to tackle old problems in cognitive science and also in philosophy. In 
this afterword, l want to sketch what dual-process theories imply for diverse issues in 
philosophy, mostly for teaching critical thinking, but also for how we should think about 
knowledge in a naturalized framework. Dual-process theories, l believe, offer numerous 
prospects for future research, including but not limited to: pedagogical recommendations 
about teaching critical thinking and logic (Beaulac and Robert, submitted; Stanovich and 
West, 2008), and reflection on the building of 'cognitive niches' to enhance cognition 
(Poirier and Beaulac, in preparation). AIso, such a framework can bring new ideas about the 
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nature of knowledge, and it can push further the research on knowledge as a natural kind, 
building on work such as Clarke's (2004) work in epistemology (Beaulac, in preparation; 
Clarke, in preparation). Recent proposais also argue dual-process theories might even provide 
us with a framework to understand concepts in psychology (Clarke, in preparation; Piccinini, 
forthcoming; Poirier and Beaulac, forthcoming; but see Machery, forthcoming for a reply in 
which we can find objections to dual-process theories discussed in this dissertation). 
This work is only a small part of where a dual-process perspective on the mind can take 
us. To give a few other examples (I have no pretention of being exhaustive here): Darlow and 
Sloman, 2010 and de Sousa (2010) have applied similar accounts to the understanding of 
emotions; much work is being (and has been) done in moral psychology and in ethics 
(e.g. Cushman, Young and Greene, 2010; Haidt, 2001); insights from dual-process theories 
can inform work in logic and in the psychology of reasoning (e.g. Evans and Over, 2004; also 
Mercier and Sperber, forthcoming for an account of the evolution of reasoning using a 
dual-process framework); it can also provide a framework for accounts of judgment and 
decision making (Sahlin, Wallin and Persson, 2010; also Bishop and Trout, 2005 for a 
framework inspired from the heuristics and biases literature). There are also many fields of 
philosophical inquiry, where 1 know of no work that has been done for the moment, such as 
free will and the role and nature of self control mechanisms (cf. Hassin, Ochsner and 
Trope,2010) or research in the philosophy of language (building on work such as 
Stainton's 2006a work on pragmatics) that could benefit from the insights of dual-process 
theories. Moreover, sorne recent proposais also have strong similarities with dual-process 
theories: 1 have in mind here work such as Szabo-Gendler's (2008a; 2008b) on the notions of 
'alief and 'belief,' where alief can easily be described as the 'Type l' counterpart of belief. 
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5.1 Dual-Process Epistemology? 
Type 1 processes sometimes go against our best interest: our intuitions sometimes lead 
us astray. Yet, eliminating the use of Type 1 processing entirely (as suggested by Bishop and 
Trout, 2005) is both unpractical and problematic on a number of levels. First, we cannot 
eliminate these autamatie processes completely, only Jearn to circumvent them. Second, we 
might be able to replace, institutionally, human judgment with decision-making algorithms, 
but these rules cannot account for the rare exceptions that would be detected by specialists 
(e.g. Dreyfus and Dreyfus', 1986 discussions of the work of nurses). It is important to note, 
however, that these algorithms often produce statistically better results 
(cf. Gigerenzer, 2007, chapter 9). The third problem is that, in our everyday lives, we are 
faced with too complex and too diversified situations to create such rules for every situation. 
In most situations, our intuitions actually are more efficient and effective (cf. Gigerenzer 
et al., 1999; Gigerenzer, 2007). 
Yet, even if the human mind is a kluge fraught with cognitive biases and limitations, we 
are not powerless in front of its 'weaknesses.' We are not, in any way, condemned by them, 
unless we decide to ignore them. We have, after ail, discovered many of the mind's 
shortcomings - although probably not ail of them, and we might be far from having done so. 
Just as in other areas of human endeavor, discovering a flaw in a process constitutes an 
invitation to correct it, by changing the process if we can, or by writing or building a 'patch' 
when we cannot: this is what software engineers do each time they discover a flaw in a large 
program; this is also what NASA did when it discovered that the Hubble's flawed central 
mirror made it myopic. In the case of minds, we have also developed such 'patches,' which 
are calied mindwares in the literature, viz. "whatever people can learn that helps them to 
solve problems, make decisions, understand difficult concepts, and perform other 
intellectually demanding tasks better" (Perkins, 1995, 13). As Gigerenzer puts it: "[ ... ] the 
real question is not ifbut when can we trust our guts? To find the answer, we must figure out 
how intuition actually works in the fust place." (2007, 17) And when we know that a 
particular intuition is not reliable, we can devise mindwares that work around these biases 
and limitations, helping us reason better, going against this intuition in sorne contexts and ­
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more generally - abling us to see if our CUITent reasoning practices are, or not, an optimal 
way to confront a given challenge. 
Stanovich and West's (2008) model of reasoning allows for an even better understanding 
of why (effectively) teaching critical thinking is hard. They developed the idea that 
possessing the right mindware is not enough to avoid biases and errors coming from our 
intuitions. In epistemological terms, they are not enough to increase the reliability of our 
Type 1 mechanisms. Of course, what they cali the mindware gap must be filled by learning 
the appropriate mindware, but, as Kahneman and Frederick rightly pointed out, something 
else is needed: one must "possess the relevant logical rules and also to recognize the 
applicability of these rules in particular situations" (2002, 68). In order to successfully use a 
given mindware, there must be override detection, that is, the ability to detect that the 
mindware in question should be used in a particular situation. Thus, having the mindware ­
the algorithm (remember Stanovich's, 2009 subdivision of S2, cf. footnote 31) - is not 
enough. Several studies support this claim (e.g. Houdé and Moutier, 1996; 1999) and Houdé 
et al. 's (2000) study is a very good example of how we can successfully override the Type 1 
processes. It follows that possessing the right mindwares makes it possible to overcome 
Type 1 processes' limitations (Stanovich, 2004; Stanovich et al., 2008) only if knowledge 
about overriding is also provided (Houdé et al., 2000; Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich and 
West, 2008)60. 
1 believe that integrating mindwares into our account of knowledge is essential in order 
to make room for ail that matters concerning knowledge61 , since we have the ability to correct 
60 This may mean there are different types and different levels of mindwares, but such a claim 
goes beyond the scope of what l want to discuss here. Thanks to Jean-Pierre Marquis for pointing this 
out. 
61 And, perhaps, not exclusively for human knowledge. There is evidence that certain animais do 
have processes exhibiting a number of Type 2 properties; therefore these animais could have Type 2 
knowledge, at least to a certain degree (e.g. they might not have knowledge about the limitations of 
their Type 1 processes, but they clearly have the capacity for action-rehearsal as discussed by 
Carruthers, 2006). 
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the outputs of our generally reliable knowledge mechanisms (Clarke's, 2004 modular 
knowledge) when we determine that they are less than reliable in certain contexts. What 1 
suggest for further research centered on debates in epistemology is that a part of what is 
understood as knowledge depends on mindwares - the cultural heuristics - developed to 
correct biases inherent to sorne modules. For the belief that the two lines are the same length 
in the Müller-Lyer illusion to be considered knowledge, we need an account of knowledge 
that includes something along the lines of the capacity to elaborate rules that cornpel the use 
of a ruler each time there is the need to determine the length of a line in a tricky epistemic 
context. This epistemic context can be identified because there is (scientific) knowledge 
regarding the limitations inherent to humans' evolved cognition; in this case, we know that 
the human visual system can be subject to such illusions. In other words, in the Müller-Lyer 
case, knowledge that the two lines are of the same length is linked to the knowledge of the 
unreliability of vision in this context, and to the knowledge that a ruler is a reliable tool in 
order to obtain this knowledge. 
It is thus possible, 1 believe, to devise a view of knowledge that is closer to dual-process 
theories. According to this view, there are two types of knowledge: modular knowledge that 
results from modules working autonomously (arguably identified by externalist accounts of 
knowledge) and reflective knowledge that results from our Type 2 processes, which are not 
cognitively closed, and can thus acquire mindwares and be influenced by culture (arguably 
what internalists identify). While we have no control over the first type of knowledge - e.g. it 
is impossible not to see when our eyes are open - we can control, and acquire new 
mindwares to control, Type 2 knowledge (cf. Beaulac, in preparation). 
From this perspective, we acquire culturally-designed tools to augment the reliability of 
modular knowledge, and thus learn to go beyond the Type 1 processes' suboptimal responses 
to sorne complex problems. Understanding the mind within the dual-process framework, 
individual learning, qua acquiring the means to have Type 2 knowledge, can be seen as the 
cultural diffusion of a collection of cultural items (tools, heuristics). These will enhance the 
response of Type 2 processes that need to be activated and must have the correct tools to 
produce a correct answer (cf. Poirier and Beaulac, in preparation). In epistemology, this 
means that the reliability of modular knowledge can, with the use of mindwares, be 
96 
increased. This view of knowledge is, l believe, more comprehensive than most other 
naturalized accounts of knowledge. 
My proposition then is to be understood along these lines: a more inclusive conception of 
knowledge would have to include the methods of science in order (i) to have a better 
understanding of the cognitive structures underlying knowledge, which includes learning 
about their limitations, (ii) to develop that tools and heuristics necessary to correct, or 
ameliorate, human cognition - what Clarke (2004) calls the meliora/ive projec/62 and (iii) to 
make easier the recognition of the epistemic limitations of Type 1 processes in order to be 
able to identify when it is necessary to use Type 2 processes. As Clarke explains, we must 
"[f]irst, work at understanding early-developing, task-specitic mechanisms and; second, 
study how further cognitive processes are built on top of the initial ones to overcome their 
limitations" (2004, 40). l hope that the material l developed in this dissertation can help 
advancing both ofthese goals. 
62 Bishop and Trout (2005) call this Ameliorative Psychology. 
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